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KILLING THE PATIENT TO CURE THE DISEASE: 
MEDICARE’S JURISDICTIONAL BAR DOES NOT APPLY TO 
BANKRUPTCY COURTS 
Samuel R. Maizel∗ 
Michael B. Potere∗∗ 
ABSTRACT  
Sections 405(g) and 405(h) of the Social Security Act require exhaustion of 
administrative remedies prior to judicial review for any claims brought under 
the Medicare Act. Generally, these claims arise when the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services decides that a hospital owes the government for prior 
overpayment. The appeal of such decisions can take years, potentially forcing 
hospitals to close due to a lack of continued Medicare payments. As such, 
filing for bankruptcy protection quickly becomes one of the hospital's primary 
avenues for survival. Historically, however, some bankruptcy courts have 
looked to the legislative context of § 405(h) and determined that bankruptcy 
courts lack jurisdiction over Medicare claims prior to the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies. This Article argues that such an interpretation is 
incorrect because the plain language of § 405(h) renders it inapplicable to a 
federal bankruptcy court's jurisdictional grant, and is also contrary to the 
Bankruptcy Code's purpose. 
INTRODUCTION 
Acute care hospitals and other providers of goods and services to Medicare 
beneficiaries face a very difficult situation. Many of the patients treated by 
hospitals, the supplies provided to patients in hospitals, and numerous other 
goods and services, are paid for by the Medicare program.1 However, if the 
 
 ∗ Samuel R. Maizel is a Partner in Dentons US LLP’s Los Angeles office; he heads the firm’s healthcare 
restructuring efforts. 
 ∗∗ Michael B. Potere is an Associate in Dentons US LLP’s Los Angeles office. 
The authors are grateful to Lori K. Mihalich-Levi, a Partner in Dentons US LLP’s Washington, D.C. 
office, and to Andy Jinnah, an Associate in Dentons US LLP’s Los Angeles office, for their assistance in the 
preparation of this article. 
 1 The Medicare Program is a federal health insurance program for people age 65 or older, people under 
age 65 with certain disabilities, and people of all ages with permanent kidney failure requiring dialysis or a 
kidney transplant. The Medicare Program has three parts: Part A Hospital Insurance covers hospice care, some 
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Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) (or a private contractor 
working under contract to CMS), which administers the Medicare Program, 
decide the hospital owes the government for a prior overpayment, the 
Medicare Program arguably has the right to recoup the amount it believes it is 
owed by offsetting it against monies otherwise payable to the hospital. The 
hospital has the right to appeal the decision, but in the meantime, its cash flow 
could be reduced to a point where it cannot stay in business and provide its 
services to Medicare beneficiaries. The right to appeal CMS’s decision is, in 
many instances, a meaningless right, because it takes years to proceed through 
the Medicare Program’s appeals process. In the meantime, many hospitals risk 
being forced to close their doors during this time because they cannot pay their 
bills if Medicare does not pay them. 
This Article addresses a unique jurisdictional issue that can shorten the 
time required to obtain judicial review of a CMS decision by going directly to 
federal bankruptcy court. Two bankruptcy court decisions from 2015, In re 
Bayou Shores, SNF, LLC2 and In re Nurses’ Registry and Home Health Corp.,3 
held that Medicare’s jurisdictional bar under 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), which would 
otherwise prevent judicial review of CMS decisions prior to exhausting 
Medicare’s appeals process, does not apply to federal bankruptcy courts. If 
bankruptcy courts continue to make this finding consistently (as this Article 
argues they should), then filing for bankruptcy would become an important 
option available to health care providers and suppliers to resolve disputes with 
CMS and the Medicare Program when they would otherwise go out of business 
absent the speedy resolution of these disputes. However, bankruptcy courts (as 
well as federal district courts and circuit courts of appeal) have debated this 
issue for more than thirty years and are not in agreement on the outcome. 
This Article concludes that debtors in bankruptcy court are exempt from  
42 U.S.C. § 405(h)’s exhaustion requirement because its plain language does 
not bar bankruptcy court jurisdiction prior to exhaustion—thus, bankruptcy 
courts do not have to wait. However, some language in § 405(h)’s “legislative 
 
home health care, inpatient care in hospitals, and some care in skilled nursing facilities; Part B Medical 
Insurance covers physician care and outpatient care among other things; and Part C covers prescription drugs. 
CMS (formerly known as the Health Care Financing Administration), is a component of the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 
Stat. 286 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 to 1395kkk-1). 
 2 525 B.R. 160, 166 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014). 
 3 533 B.R. 590, 593–94 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2015). 
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history”4 has caused courts to ignore the statute’s plain language in favor of 
trying to interpret what Congress meant when it passed §  405(h). This analysis 
is flawed; § 405(h)’s plain language should govern its interpretation and 
application. Part I of this Article discusses §  405(h)’s background and 
legislative history. Part II outlines the current state of the Medicare appeals 
process, noting the delays that plague the system. Part III discusses the 
requirement that the proceedings “arise under” the Medicare Act. Part IV 
analyzes the analytical framework in which §  405(h) has been interpreted and 
concludes that § 405(h)’s plain language, not its legislative history, should 
govern its application. 
I. BACKGROUND ON 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) AND ITS ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: 
MEDICARE’S JURISDICTIONAL BAR ABSENT EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATION 
REMEDIES 
A. Section 405(h) and Its Legislative History 
The Social Security Act requires exhaustion of administrative remedies 
prior to judicial review through 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and (h), and this 
requirement specifically applies to the Medicare Act—which itself has been 
described by courts as one of the “most completely impenetrable texts within 
human experience”5—via 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ii (incorporating § 405(h)) and 
1395ff(c) (incorporating § 405(g)).6 The relevant provisions state: 
 
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) Judicial Review 
Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner . . . may 
obtain a review of such decision by a civil action. . . . The court shall 
 
 4 In 1984, § 405(h) was amended by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 
§ 2663(a)(4)(D), 98 Stat. 1162. The language cited to by courts to read beyond § 405(h)’s plain language is 
contained in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2664(b), 98 Stat. 1162. Because  
§ 2664(b) is itself legislation, it cannot be “legislative history.” The analysis courts must employ when 
considering § 2663 in conjunction with § 2664 is that of statutory construction, and not legislative intent. Be 
that as it may, this Article uses the “legislative history” label to refer to arguments based on §  2664(b) to 
mirror the language, however imprecise, used by the courts. 
 5 Cooper Univ. Hosp. v. Sebelius, 636 F.3d 44, 45 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
 6 See also 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f) (West Supp. 1977) (added in 1974). Generally, the concept of 
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that a party is not entitled to judicial relief unless and 
until available administrative remedies have been exhausted. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 
U.S. 50–51 (1938). The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable in bankruptcy cases. 
See, e.g., In re Cottrell, 213 B.R. 33 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (discussing statutory and non-statutory exhaustion). 
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have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a 
judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the 
Commissioner . . . with or without remanding the cause for a 
rehearing. . . . The judgment of the court shall be final except that it 
shall be subject to review in the same manner as a judgment in other 
civil actions. 
42 U.S.C. § 405(h) Finality of Commissioner’s Decision 
The findings and decision of the Commissioner . . . after a hearing 
shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such 
hearing. No findings of fact or decision . . . shall be reviewed by any 
person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided. 
No action against the United States, . . . or any officer or employee 
thereof shall be brought under § 1331 or 1346 of title 28 to recover 
on any claim arising under this subchapter.7 
Absent a final decision by the applicable administrative body, federal courts 
cannot take jurisdiction over a disputed issue arising under the Social Security 
or Medicare Acts. The concept underlying this requirement is that a party is 
not entitled to federal judicial relief unless and until available administrative 
remedies have been exhausted.8 The question then becomes whether such a 
jurisdictional limitation applies only to those suits brought pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1336, or if § 405(h) applies to other federal jurisdictional 
grants, including the bankruptcy courts’ jurisdictional grant in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1334. 
Section 405 was enacted in 1939 as part of the Social Security Act.9 At that 
time, it barred jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 41.10 Section 41 contained 
 
 7 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), (h) (2015). In this discussion, we address an instance where the exhaustion 
requirement is based on a statute. There are cases, however, where courts have required parties to exhaust their 
administrative remedies based on the court’s discretion, rather than a statute. In such cases requiring the 
exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is generally thought to encourage more economical and less formal 
means of dispute resolution, as well as to promote efficiency. See generally Stephens v. Pension Benefit Guar. 
Corp., 755 F.3d 959, 964–66 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (discussing ERISA). 
 8 See generally Myers, 303 U.S. at 50–51. 
 9 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (Supp. V 1939); BP Care, Inc. v. Thompson, 398 F.3d 503, 515 n.11 (6th Cir. 
2005). See Pub. L. No. 76-379, § 205(h), 53 Stat. 1360, 1371 (1939) (amendment to Social Security Act 
adding jurisdictional bar now found at 42 U.S.C. § 405(h)). 
 10 In 1939, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) stated: 
The findings and decision of the Board after a hearing shall be binding upon all individuals who 
were parties to such hearing. No- findings of fact or decision of the Board shall be reviewed by 
any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided. No action against the 
United States, the Board, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under section 41 of 
Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under sections 401–09 of this chapter. 
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twenty-eight sub-sections that granted the United States district courts 
“original jurisdiction” over various types of claims, including, in sub-section 
19, “all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy.”11 In 1948, when Congress 
revised the U.S. Code, it extracted these jurisdictional grants from § 41 and re-
codified some of them as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 to 1348, 1350 to 1357, 1359, 
1397, 2361, 2401, and 2402.12 The re-codification included numerous 
substantive changes, such as removing the designation of a married woman as 
“disabled” for the purpose of tolling of the statute of limitations for her to 
bring a claim against the United States government.13 Although Congress re-
wrote § 41, it did not correspondingly update § 405(h), which maintained its 
reference to § 41 for the next three decades. As such, § 405(h) was applied as 
though it referred to all of the jurisdictional grants that previously existed in 
§ 41, largely due to the proposition in the 1975 Supreme Court decision 
Weinberger v. Salfi that the 1948 re-codification of 28 U.S.C. § 41 “caused no 
substantive change in the coverage of [§ 405(h)’s] jurisdictional bar.”14 
In 1976, one year after the Weinberger decision, the Office of Law 
Revision Counsel15 revised § 405(h) by removing its reference to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 41 and replacing it with references to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question 
jurisdiction) and 1346 (suits against the United States).16 Seemingly (and to at 
least one court, “clearly”), these were the only jurisdictional grants the Office 
 
See also BP Care, Inc., 398 F.3d at 515 n.11. 
 11 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1946), 36 Stat. 1091, 1093 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § 41(19) (1934). 
 12 Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869, 930–35 (1948); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1348, 1350–1357, 1359, 1397, 
2361, 2401, 2402 (1952); see also In re St. Mary Hosp., 123 B.R. 14, 17 (E.D. Pa. 1991). Absent from the re-
codification was, for example, § 41(4)’s grant of original jurisdiction in the federal district courts for “all suits 
arising under any law relating to the slave trade.” 28 U.S.C. § 41(4) (1946). 
 13 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 41(20) (1946) (“The claims of married women, first accrued during 
marriage . . . entitled to the claim, shall not be barred if the suit be brought within three years after the 
disability has ceased . . . .”), with 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (1952) (“The action of any person under legal disability or 
beyond the seas at the time the claim accrues may be commenced within three years after the disability 
ceases.”). 
 14 In re Nurses’ Registry & Home Health Corp., 533 B.R. 590, 594 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2015) (citing 
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 756 n.3 (1975) (“The literal wording of this section bars actions under 28 
U.S.C. § 41. At the time § 405(h) was enacted, and prior to the 1948 re-codification of Title 28, § 41 contained 
all of that title’s grants of jurisdiction to United States district courts, save for several special-purpose 
jurisdictional grants of no relevance to the constitutionality of Social Security statutes.”)). 
 15 The Office of the Law Revision Counsel is part of the United States House of Representatives and 
publishes the United States Code. See 2 U.S.C. § 285(b) (2015). The United States Code contains the general 
and permanent laws of the United States. 
 16 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1346; BP Care, Inc. v. Thompson, 398 F.3d 503, 515 n.11 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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of Law Revision Counsel believed were relevant to Medicare Act claims.17 
And so, after almost three decades, the Social Security Act caught up with and 
incorporated the changes in the Code pertaining to federal court jurisdiction. 
Eight years later, in 1984, Congress expressly enacted the Law Revision 
Counsel’s changes as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (“DRA”).18 As 
part of the DRA, Congress enacted a provision entitled, “Effective Dates,” 
which stated in sub-section (b) that: 
Except to the extent otherwise specifically provided in this subtitle, 
the amendments made by section 2663 shall be effective on the date 
of the enactment of this Act; but none of such amendments shall be 
construed as changing or affecting any right, liability, status, or 
interpretation which existed (under the provisions of law involved) 
before that date.19 
Some courts have found that this provision represents Congress’s caution to 
the courts not to interpret § 2663’s “technical corrections” as “substantive 
changes” to § 405(h).20 In so doing, however, these courts have ignored 
§ 405(h)’s facially limited applicability to §§ 1331 or 1346.21 
B. Section 405(h)’s Purpose and Application 
Section 405(h) serves two primary purposes. First, its rigorous enforcement 
is said to aid in and benefit from the development of the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services’s expertise.22 Second, it is intended to prevent 
“disgruntled” claimants from bringing actions in federal court instead of 
exhausting their remedies with the agency.23 
 
 17 Nurses’ Registry, 533 B.R. at 594 (“Clearly the Office of Law Revision Counsel believed that these 
grants of jurisdiction were the only ones relevant to SSA or Medicare Act claims.”). 
 18 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2663(a)(4)(D), 98 Stat. 1162 (“Section 205(h) of 
such Act is amended by striking out ‘section 24 of the Judicial Code of the United States’ and inserting in lieu 
thereof ‘section 1331 or 1346 of title 28, United States Code . . . .’”). Changes to a statute by the Law Revision 
Counsel are not binding absent enactment by Congress. 
 19 Deficit Reduction Act § 2664(b) (emphasis added). 
 20 E.g., In re St. Mary Hosp., 123 B.R. 14, 17 (E.D. Pa. 1991). 
 21 See Midland Psychiatric Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 145 F.3d 1000, 1004 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying 
a jurisdictional bar in a case invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1332); Bodimetric Health Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas., 
903 F.2d 480, 488–89 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying a jurisdictional bar in a case invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1332); Total 
Renal Labs., Inc. v. Shalala, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1331 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (applying a jurisdictional bar in a case 
invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1361). 
 22 E.g., St. Mary Hosp., 123 B.R. at 17. 
 23 United States v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 343 F. Supp. 2d 922, 926–27 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
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With these purposes in mind, hundreds of courts, including dozens of 
bankruptcy courts, have analyzed the applicability of § 405(h) since the 1980s. 
During that time, courts have elaborated on the legal standard for determining 
whether § 405(h) applies to bar a court’s jurisdiction. The first step in the 
analysis is to determine whether the claim “arises under” the Medicare Act.24 If 
it does, the next step—and the question we address herein—is whether the 
claim falls within § 405(h)’s jurisdiction: “under § 1331 or 1346 of title 28.”25 
As discussed in more detail below, one line of cases looks to § 405(h)’s 
legislative context and defines that jurisdictional grant broadly to include all 
forms of federal court jurisdiction, including bankruptcy jurisdiction under  
28 U.S.C. § 1334;26 the other line of cases reasons (correctly, in our view) that 
the plain language of § 405(h) only restricts judicial review prior to exhaustion 
for claims brought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1346.27 
A claim “arises under” the Medicare Act when: (1) the “standing and 
substantive basis for the presentation” of the claim is the Medicare Act;28 and 
(2) the claim is “inextricably intertwined” with a claim for Medicare benefits.29 
In evaluating whether a claim arises under the Medicare Act, courts have 
looked beyond whether the claim was allegedly brought under the 
Constitution, other federal statutes, or even state law, to find that the claim 
nevertheless arose under the Medicare Act because it was inextricably 
intertwined with the Medicare Act.30 Courts have also “refused to treat the 
remedy sought as dispositive of the ‘arising under’ question.”31 In essence, the 
issue as to whether a claim “arises under” the Medicare Act is very broadly 
interpreted.32 
 
 24 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (2015); see also Quinones v. United Health Grp. Inc., No. 14-00497, 2015 WL 
3965961, at *4 (D. Haw. June 30, 2015); Nat’l Ass’n for Home Care & Hospice, Inc. v. Burwell, 77 F. Supp. 
3d 103, 109 (D.D.C. 2015); In re St. Johns Home Health Agency, Inc., 173 B.R. 238, 244–45 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
1994). 
 25 E.g., Bodimetric Health Servs., 903 F.2d at 488. 
 26 E.g., Nicole Med. Equip. & Supply, Inc. v. TriCenturion, Inc., No. 10-389, 2011 WL 1162052, at *14 
n.24 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2011). 
 27 E.g., In re Town & Country Home Nursing Servs., Inc., 963 F.2d 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 28 Do Sung Uhm v. Humana, Inc., 620 F.3d 1134, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Heckler v. Ringer, 466 
U.S. 602, 615 (1984)). 
 29 Id. 
 30 See id. at 1141–42. 
 31 Id. at 1142. 
 32 Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 14 (2000) (“Claims for money, claims for 
other benefits, claims of program eligibility, and claims that contest a sanction or remedy may all similarly rest 
upon individual fact-related circumstances, may all similarly dispute agency policy determinations, or may all 
similarly involve the application, interpretation, or constitutionality of interrelated regulations or statutory 
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If a claim both arises under the Medicare Act and falls within § 405(h)’s 
jurisdictional bar, a court may not review the claim unless it has received a 
final decision from the Secretary.33 This finality requirement has two elements. 
First, it has a non-waivable requirement that the claim has been “presented to” 
the Secretary.34 Second, it has a waivable requirement that the Secretary’s 
administrative remedies have been “exhausted,” commonly known as the 
“exhaustion requirement.”35 Determining whether the exhaustion requirement 
can be waived in any case is not “mechanical” and should be “guided by” the 
exhaustion requirement’s underlying policies.36 Instead, and after the claim has 
been “presented to” the Secretary, courts analyze three factors from the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Mathews v. Eldridge to determine if the 
exhaustion requirement should be waived: (1) whether the claim is “collateral” 
to the demand for benefits, (2) whether exhaustion would be “futile,” and  
(3) whether the plaintiff would suffer “irreparable harm” if required to navigate 
the agency’s review process.37 A claim is “collateral” when it challenges an 
agency policy and the outcome of the merits of that challenge does not impact 
the plaintiff’s benefits award—in other words, “if [the claim] doesn’t 
automatically increase benefits if successful.”38 Whether a claim is “futile” 
turns on its futility within the context of the Medicare system—in other words, 
whether favorable agency review could actually grant the plaintiff the relief 
sought.39 Finally, “irreparable harm” results when any damage caused to the 
plaintiff by the delay awaiting final agency review cannot be remedied with 
money.40 In addition to the Eldridge factors, courts will weigh the harm to the 
government and the purpose of the Medicare Act when determining whether to 
waive a plaintiff’s exhaustion requirement.41 For our purposes, however, we 
focus on the period before the Eldridge exhaustion review and consider 
 
provisions. There is no reason to distinguish among them in terms of the language or in terms of the purposes 
of § 405(h).”). 
 33 E.g., Nat’l Ass’n for Home Care & Hospice, Inc. v. Burwell, 77 F. Supp. 3d 103, 109 (D.D.C. 2015) 
(citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 326 (1976)). 
 34 E.g., id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. (citing Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 484 (1986)). 
 37 Miller v. Burwell, No. 14-CV-4245, 2015 WL 2257278, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2015) (citing 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 330 (1976); Martin v. Shalala, 63 F.3d 497, 504 (7th Cir.1995)). 
 38 Miller, 2015 WL 2257278, at *6. 
 39 Id. at *7. 
 40 Id. (quoting Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000)). 
 41 E.g., V.N.A. of Greater Tift Cty. v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 1020, 1032 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied 466 
U.S. 936 (1984). 
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whether § 405(h) applies to bar a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction prior to 
exhaustion in the first place. 
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF MEDICARE CLAIMS DISPUTES PROCESS AND 
APPEALS 
A. Steps in the Medicare Appeals Process 
There are several ways a hospital can become involved in a Medicare 
dispute. First, Medicare could deny a hospital’s claim or a group of claims. 
Second, Medicare could review a hospital’s annual cost report and decide the 
hospital was overpaid. And third, Medicare could suspend payments due to 
concerns about a hospital’s billing practices, including allegations of fraud. 
Regarding the first avenue, the Medicare appeals process for a denied 
hospital claim contains five distinct steps. Medicare contractors, under the 
supervision of CMS, conduct the first two levels of review.42 First, the hospital 
could ask the Medicare Administrative Contractor (“MAC”) (also referred to 
as a “fiscal intermediary” (“FI”)) that actually denied its claims or declared the 
overpayment to “redetermine” its decision. Initial submitted claims are usually 
quite rudimentary, but to commence the redetermination the hospital has to 
compile documents that support its claim and file the appeal within 120 days of 
the denial.43 If that redetermination is denied (the MAC has 60 days to act), the 
hospital has 180 days to file for reconsideration to the Qualified Independent 
Contractor (“QIC”).44 If this appeal is denied (the QIC has 60 days to decide), 
the hospital can appeal to an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) who operates 
under the supervision of the Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals 
(“OMHA”).45 If the ALJ decides against the hospital, the next level of appeal 
is the Medicare Appeals Council of the Departmental Appeals Board 
(“DAB”).46 The DAB decision is the “final decision” referenced in § 405(g), 
 
 42 Courts have not allowed suits against these private contractors to proceed as a way to avoid the 
jurisdictional bar to suing the federal agency (CMS) itself. See, e.g., Bodimetric Health Services, Inc. v. Aetna 
Life & Cas., 903 F.2d 480, 487–88 (7th Cir. 1990). This is because Medicare contractors are merely conduits 
for payment and have no vested interest in the Medicare funds they administer. 42 U.S.C. § 1395kk-
1(a)(4)(A), (B) (2015). 
 43 42 C.F.R. § 405.942(a) (2015). 
 44 42 C.F.R. § 405.962(a). 
 45 42 C.F.R. § 405.1000. 
 46 42 C.F.R. § 405.1100. 
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so that only after the DAB decides can a federal court have jurisdiction over 
the matter in dispute.47 
Another avenue a hospital may take through the Medicare appeals process 
is based on a review of a hospital’s cost report. At the end of a hospital’s fiscal 
year, it files a “cost report” that describes the actual claims submitted during 
that year. A MAC or FI reviews the cost report and makes an initial 
determination of whether the hospital was overpaid or underpaid during the 
cost year.48 If the hospital was overpaid, the MAC or FI will issue a notice of 
overpayment, and if payment is not forthcoming, may recover the overpayment 
through recoupment of outgoing payments. The MAC or FI subsequently 
performs a full audit of the cost report and issues a Notice of Program 
Reimbursement (“NPR”), which is the MAC’s final determination as to the 
alleged overpayment.49 The MAC has seven years to issue the NPR, however, 
and thus the process can be lengthy. The hospital may appeal an adverse NPR 
to the Provider Reimbursement and Review Board (“PRRB”),50 and it is only 
after receiving a PRRB decision that a hospital may obtain judicial review of 
an adverse NPR in federal district court.51 
Finally, if there are questions about a hospital’s claims against Medicare, 
the Medicare Program can institute administrative measures, such as a 
prepayment review of claims or a suspension of payments, which may result in 
delayed, smaller, or even the absence of payments to the hospital.52 If a 
payment suspension is initiated, the hospital can submit a rebuttal that the 
CMS or the MAC reviews. A suspension is generally not appealable, but once 
a determination of an overpayment is made, the same appeals process for 
denied claims (described above) applies. 
So, naturally, the question is “how long does all this take?” The answer: it 
can be a really long time.53 Why? Because review at the ALJ level is broken. 
 
 47 Review by the DAB is discretionary, and if it decides to review the ALJ decision, the ALJ decision 
becomes the “final” decision.  
 48 42 C.F.R. § 413.20. 
 49 42 C.F.R. § 405.1803. 
 50 The PRRB reviews costs reports and handles “provider” payment disputes that are not claims related. 
MACs also review “claims” including “supplier” claim payment issues. (Suppliers are not providers, so MACs 
use a different process for claims payment issues). Providers also use the ALJ process for claims disputes. 
 51 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a) (2015); 42 C.F.R. § 405.1835. 
 52 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.370–75. As a general rule, suspensions are limited to 180 days, with a possible one-
time 180-day extension. However, there are some exceptions that allow longer suspensions. 
 53 The average processing time for appeals decided by the OMHA in fiscal year 2015 was 547.1 days, a 
number that may be underreporting the problem because an increasing number of appeals in 2015 also created 
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The OMHA is currently staffed to handle approximately 72,000 claims on 
appeal in a year. However, as of July 1, 2014, it had over 800,000 claims 
pending on appeal and was getting an additional 10,000 to 16,000 claim 
appeals per week (while it can only dispose of approximately 1,300 claims per 
week).54 The situation is so bad that as of June 2015, Medicare offered to settle 
over 300,000 appeals based on inpatient claims for sixty-eight cents on the 
dollar.55 
B. A Hospital’s Dilemma 
As discussed above, a hospital’s appeals process can take a long time. And 
once the QIC’s decision is made, CMS can institute recoupment56 against the 
hospital’s ongoing payments (and while the ALJ decision is pending). 
Although the hospital will be repaid if it later prevails in the appeals process, 
this creates a potentially fatal dilemma. On the one hand, the hospital must 
exhaust the administrative process before appealing the Medicare Program’s 
decision in federal district court. Yet, the delay associated with exhausting the 
administrative process could put the hospital out of business by reducing the 
hospital’s cash flow to a point where it could not continue to operate pending 
the administrative decision. Thus, the hospital’s only viable option may be to 
eschew the administrative process by filing for bankruptcy. Bankruptcy courts, 
in turn, have been wrestling with the issue of whether they have jurisdiction 
over this type of matter for decades. 
III. SECTION 405(h)’S APPLICATION IN BANKRUPTCY CASES 
Although 28 U.S.C. § 1334 provides the statutory basis for bankruptcy 
courts’ jurisdiction and expressly makes that jurisdiction “exclusive,”57 courts 
 
a 20–24 week delay in even docketing new requests into OMHA’s case processing system. Adjudication 
Timeframes, OFFICE OF MEDICARE HEARINGS AND APPEALS, http://www.hhs.gov/omha/important_notice_ 
regarding_adjudication_timeframes.html (last visited December 21, 2015). 
 54 Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals Workloads: Hearing on Exploring Medicare Appeal Reform 
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform & the Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Healthcare & 
Entitlements, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Nancy J. Griswold, Chief A.L.J., Office of Medicare Hearings 
and Appeals), www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2014/07/t20140710a.html (last visited on Feb. 13, 2015). 
 55 Inpatient Hospital Reviews, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (Sept. 23, 2015, 9:26 
PM), https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/monitoring-programs/medicare-ffs-compliance-
programs/medical-review/inpatienthospitalreviews.html. 
 56 Recoupment occurs when Medicare recovers an overpayment by withholding from ongoing payments 
to a provider. 
 57 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2015) (emphasis added). 
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analyzing § 405(h) in the bankruptcy context are nevertheless split on whether 
its jurisdictional limitation to claims “brought under § 1331 or 1346 of title 28” 
also bars judicial review absent exhaustion under the bankruptcy jurisdictional 
grant, § 1334. The line of cases finding that bankruptcy cases do not fall under 
§ 405(h) primarily rely on § 405(h)’s plain language (which is limited to 
§§ 1331 and 1346), as well as § 1334’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the 
bankruptcy courts over the debtor’s estate.58 The line of cases holding that 
bankruptcy claims do fall within § 405(h)’s jurisdiction bar and require 
presentment and exhaustion to the Secretary before seeking judicial review 
primarily rely upon § 405(h)’s legislative context, which the courts argue 
implicitly cites to every jurisdictional grant contained in the former 28 U.S.C. 
§ 41, and therefore includes bankruptcy jurisdiction.59 
Outside of the bankruptcy context, courts are understandably less likely to 
find that parties are able to avoid § 405(h)’s jurisdictional bar. For example, 
courts have held that claims brought under mandamus jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. 
§ 1361) and diversity jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1332) are not excused from 
Medicare’s exhaustion requirement.60 Although § 405(h)’s plain language 
 
 58 E.g., In re Nurses’ Registry & Home Health Corp., 533 B.R. 590, 595 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2015); In re 
Bayou Shores SNF, LLC, 525 B.R. 160, 166 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014); In re Consol. Med. Transp., Inc., 300 
B.R. 435, 445 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003); In re Slater Health Ctr., Inc., 294 B.R. 423, 428 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2003), 
vacated in part, 306 B.R. 20 (D.R.I. 2004), aff’d, 398 F.3d 98 (1st Cir. 2005); First Am. Health Care of Ga., 
Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 208 B.R. 985, 989 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996), vacated and 
superseded, No. 96-2007, 1996 WL 282149 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 1996); In re Rusnak, 184 B.R. 459, 
462–63 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995); In re Healthmaster Home Health Care, Inc., No. 95-01031A, 1995 WL 
928920, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Apr. 13, 1995); In re Univ. Med. Ctr., Inc., 973 F.2d 1065, 1072 (3d Cir. 
1992); In re Town & Country Home Nursing Servs., Inc., 963 F.2d 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 1991); In re Shelby 
Cty. Healthcare Servs. of Ala., Inc., 80 B.R. 555, 559–60 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987); In re Clawson Med., Rehab. 
& Pain Care Ctr., P.C., 9 B.R. 644, 648 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.), rev’d, 12 B.R. 647 (E.D. Mich. 1981). 
 59 E.g., In re Hodges, 364 B.R. 304, 306 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007) (analyzing in the Social Security 
context); In re House of Mercy, Inc., 353 B.R. 867, 872 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2006); Excel Home Care, Inc. v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 316 B.R. 565, 572 (D. Mass. 2004); U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs. v. James, 256 B.R. 479, 481 (W.D. Ky. 2000); In re Hosp. Staffing Servs., Inc., 258 B.R. 53, 56 (S.D. 
Fla. 2000); In re Mid-Delta Health Sys., Inc., 251 B.R. 811, 816 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1999); In re Tri County 
Home Health Servs., Inc., 230 B.R. 106 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1999); In re S. Inst. for Treatment & Evaluation, 
Inc., 217 B.R. 962, 965 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998); In re AHN Homecare, LLC, 222 B.R. 804, 812 (Bankr. N.D. 
Tex. 1998); In re Home Comp Care, Inc., 221 B.R. 202, 206 (N.D. Ill. 1998); In re Orthotic Ctr., Inc., 193 
B.R. 832, 835 (N.D. Ohio 1996); In re St. Johns Home Health Agency, Inc., 173 B.R. 238, 245–46 (Bankr. 
S.D. Fla. 1994); In re Upsher Labs., Inc., 135 B.R. 117, 119 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991); In re St. Mary Hosp., 
123 B.R. 14, 17 (E.D. Pa. 1991); In re Visiting Nurse Ass’n of Tampa Bay, Inc., 121 B.R. 114 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 1990); In re Berger, 16 B.R. 236, 237–38 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); Clawson, 12 B.R. at 653. 
 60 E.g., BP Care, Inc. v. Thompson, 398 F.3d 503, 515 (6th Cir. 2005) (mandamus jurisdiction); 
Bodimetric Health Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas., 903 F.2d 480, 488–89 (7th Cir. 1990) (diversity 
jurisdiction); Nicole Med. Equip. & Supply, Inc. v. TriCenturion, Inc., No. 10-389, 2011 WL 1162052, at *4 
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makes this reading strained, the outcome at least makes more sense in the 
context of mandamus and diversity jurisdiction because those jurisdictional 
grants are more susceptible to concealing a Medicare claim under the guise of 
another claim to improperly avoid going through the Medicare appeals process. 
And, more importantly, the parties employing mandamus or diversity statutes 
in a federal district court may not face the same potential fate as a hospital that 
has initiated bankruptcy proceedings: slow resolution of the claim by the 
Medicare appeals process could be that hospital’s death knell. In short, debtors 
in bankruptcy courts fighting for their survival should be treated differently 
under the law.  
A. Overview of § 405(h) Litigation in Bankruptcy Courts 
1. In re Clawson Medical, Rehabilitation and Pain Care Center 
Three cases capture the bulk of the substantive arguments employed in the 
analysis between § 405(h) and bankruptcy jurisdiction. Among the first cases 
to discuss the issue, 1981’s In re Clawson Medical, Rehabilitation and Pain 
Care Center,61 also happens to be among the most comprehensive. Clawson 
involved a Medicare service provider that sought the bankruptcy court’s order 
enjoining Medicare from taking actions that would have “reduced the debtor’s 
revenues below levels at which the business can be operated.”62 The Clawson 
court noted that this factual context was “becoming increasingly familiar to the 
courts,” albeit not in the bankruptcy context.63 The debtor alleged that the 
changes in its Medicare payments rendered the continuation of its business 
untenable and, combined with delays in the Medicare appeals review process, 
would cause it to cease operations.64 The bankruptcy court granted the debtor’s 
motion.65  
The Clawson court first reasoned that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
197866 gave the bankruptcy courts “exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor’s 
 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2011) (diversity jurisdiction); Younes v. Burwell, No. 15-11225, 2015 WL 3556689, at *2 
(E.D. Mich. Apr. 2, 2015) (diversity jurisdiction). 
 61 9 B.R. 644. 
 62 Id. at 646. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 649–50, 652. 
 66 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 301). At 
the time, the bankruptcy jurisdiction statute was 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e) (1978). 
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property.”67 This, in turn, authorized bankruptcy court jurisdiction over a 
debtor’s estate and claims “irrespective of congressional statements to the 
contrary in the context of specialized legislation.”68 This jurisdiction included 
jurisdiction over issues the resolution of which would “have a considerable 
impact on the [debtor’s] estate and on its prospects for effecting a successful 
reorganization.”69 Because such determinations were “crucial” to the 
administration of the debtor’s estate, the Clawson court found it had 
jurisdiction over the debtor’s claims, irrespective of the language of § 405(h).70 
The Clawson court then went on to explain that § 405(h) did not bar its 
jurisdiction over the debtor’s claims because it only applies “in disputes to 
which it is applicable.”71 And because § 405(h) did not expressly bar 
jurisdiction under what was then numbered 28 U.S.C. § 1471, it did not bar 
review of the debtor’s Medicare claims.72 Indeed, the court reasoned, “[s]uch 
omission has been found to permit review under other sections of Title 28[] 
and is indicative of Congressional intent not to preclude jurisdiction.”73 The 
court noted that the Bankruptcy Reform Act “extensively” amended the 
Bankruptcy Code but did not include a reference to the revised statute in 
§ 405(h) and concluded that, “in the absence of ‘clear and convincing 
evidence’ of legislative intent to preclude or condition this Court’s jurisdiction, 
no further barriers will be erected.”74 This reasoning was consistent with 
Congress’s intent for revamping the Bankruptcy Code: eliminating the 
“frequent, time-consuming and expensive litigation of the question whether the 
bankruptcy court has jurisdiction of a particular proceeding.”75 One way to 
 
 67 Clawson, 9 B.R. at 647. This authorizes bankruptcy court jurisdiction over a debtor’s estate and claims 
“irrespective of congressional statements to the contrary in the context of specialized legislation.” See also In 
re Town & Country Home Nursing Servs., Inc., 963 F.2d 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 68 Clawson, 9 B.R. at 647. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 647–48. 
 71 Id. at 648. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. (citing White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 855–56 (2d Cir. 1977); Whitecliff, Inc. v. United States, 
536 F.2d 347, 351 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Fox v. Harris, 488 F. Supp. 488 (D.D.C. 1980) (emphasis added), rev’d, 12 
B.R. 647 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Ark. Soc’y of Pathologists v. Harris, CCH Medicare and Medicaid Guide, ¶ 30, 
706 (E.D. Ark. 1980). 
 74 Clawson, 9 B.R. at 648 (citing Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373–74 (1974); Chelsea Comm. 
Hosp., SNF v. Mich. Blue Cross Ass’n, 630 F.2d 1131, 1132–36 (6th Cir. 1980); Wayne State Univ. v. 
Cleland, 590 F.2d 627, 632 (6th Cir. 1980)). 
 75 Clawson, 9 B.R. at 648–49 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 45 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6007). 
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accomplish such a goal was through a comprehensive jurisdictional grant to the 
bankruptcy courts over the debtor’s estate and its corresponding claims.76 
Finally, in the context of its preliminary injunction analysis, the Clawson 
court discussed in depth both (1) the harm the debtor would face if it were 
forced to stop operating because its Medicare payments were stopped and  
(2) that the Medicare review process took so long the debtor became unable to 
cover its operating expenses.77 It found that, once shut down, the likelihood the 
debtor would be able to revive the business would be low, in part due to the 
“loss of goodwill” the debtor would suffer as a result.78 Because revival would 
be unlikely, the debtor would be forced to liquidate, and the estate’s value at 
liquidation would likewise have decreased in value due to the shutdown.79 The 
Clawson court recognized (as courts regularly do in the trademark and 
intellectual property context, for example) that the value of lost goodwill 
would be “difficult if not impossible” to calculate and recover in monetary 
damages.80 Moreover, shutting down would harm the debtor’s patients and 
employees, who would be forced to seek out other facilities and jobs—an 
unnecessary toll on innocent parties, particularly if the debtor’s claims were 
successful.81 For all these reasons, the Clawson court determined the “best” 
reading of the statute was that it had jurisdiction over the debtor’s Medicare 
claims.82 
2. In re St. Johns Home Health Agency 
The second case, decided nearly fifteen years later, was In re St. Johns 
Home Health Agency,83 and there, the bankruptcy court came to a different 
conclusion. Faced with facts similar to Clawson, the St. Johns court declined to 
take jurisdiction over the debtor’s Medicare claims in the bankruptcy court for 
three primary reasons. First, it found that the absence of reference to 
bankruptcy jurisdiction in § 405(h) was due to a scrivener’s error, basing its 
conclusion on § 405(h)’s “legislative history,” and thus bankruptcy jurisdiction 
 
 76 Id. at 649. 
 77 Id. at 650–52. 
 78 Id. at 650. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 650–51; see also Dunkin’ Donuts Franchised Rests. v. Elkhatib, No. 09 C 1912, 2009 WL 
2192753, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 2009) (stating that loss of goodwill is impossible to quantify or reverse). 
 81 Clawson, 9 B.R. at 651. 
 82 Id. 
 83 173 B.R. 238, 242, 247–48 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994). Sam Maizel, one of this Article’s authors, 
represented the United States in In re St. Johns Home Health Agency, Inc. 
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was incorporated implicitly by reference.84 Second, the court voiced concern 
that, if it did have jurisdiction, a hospital might use a bankruptcy filing as a 
“shortcut to judicial review” of a party’s administrative claims.85 Finally, and 
perhaps most surprisingly, the St. Johns court indicated that it did not matter 
whether, as a result of its ruling, the debtor would be unable to reorganize.86 
3. In re Healthback 
The third case is 1999’s In re Healthback.87 Like the court in Clawson, the 
court in Healthback also concluded that independent bankruptcy jurisdiction 
existed to cover the claim, that § 405(h)’s plain language does not include 
§ 1346’s bankruptcy jurisdictional grant, and that jurisdiction was supported by 
the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code because the debtor might cease to exist 
without its protection.88  
The Healthback court also addressed three new arguments. First, it held 
that § 405(h)’s legislative history cautioning courts against reading a 
substantive change into the technical modifications is inapposite because 
§ 405(h)’s jurisdictional grant is procedural in nature.89 This argument is 
discussed in more detail in Section V below. Second, it rejected the Secretary’s 
argument that it could not “judicial[ly] review” the debtor’s Medicare claim.90 
According to the court, “judicial review” means “review of an administrative 
decision [in] an adjudicatory process to directly determine [its] legality.”91 
Thus, “judicial review” is not what a bankruptcy court does; instead, 
bankruptcy courts “exercise jurisdiction over the property of the estate to 
ensure that all creditors are treated equally within the scope of the Bankruptcy 
 
 84 Id. at 244; see also Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2664(b), 98 Stat. 1162. 
 85 St. Johns Home Health Agency, Inc., 173 B.R. at 243 (“[T]he possibility that its administrative remedy 
may not provide relief as quickly as St. Johns desires, or indeed may require to survive, is one of the 
potentially unfortunate consequences of doing business in a heavily regulated field where compensation is 
highly dependent upon administrative processes. . . . [P]roviders which [sic] choose to operate within the 
Medicare system on a cash-poor basis take a knowing risk that an intermediary’s determination might delay 
payment, and their risk of being forced out of business alone does not justify a fundamental deviation from the 
statutory scheme[.]” (citing V.N.A. of Greater Tift Cty. v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 1020, 1034 (11th Cir.1983), cert. 
denied 466 U.S. 936 (1984))). 
 86 173 B.R. at 242, 243–44. 
 87 226 B.R. 464, 479 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998), vacated, No. 97-22616, 1999 WL 35012949 (Bankr. 
W.D. Okla. May 28, 1999). 
 88 Id. at 469–71, 473–74. 
 89 Id. at 472–73. 
 90 Id. at 469–70. 
 91 Id. 
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Code.”92 That a bankruptcy court’s administration of the debtor’s estate might 
frustrate the Secretary’s jurisdiction does not “constitute illegal interference” 
with the same.93 Finally, the court rejected the Secretary’s “primary 
jurisdiction doctrine” argument, which would require a judicial body to defer 
the decision-making process to the administrative agency’s “special 
competence.”94 The Healthback court determined that the doctrine cannot be 
relied upon at the “whim” of a pleader and instead may only be invoked “if the 
benefits of obtaining the agency’s aid would outweigh the need to resolve the 
litigation expeditiously.”95 
4. Other §  405(h) Arguments Analyzed in the Bankruptcy Context 
Other arguments courts have considered when determining whether the 
§ 405(h) jurisdictional bar applies in bankruptcy cases include: whether 
Medicare payments are themselves an asset in the debtor’s estate,96 whether a 
 
 92 Id. at 470. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 470–71 (“The doctrine of primary jurisdiction, generally, requires that where a matter has been 
placed under the authority and special competence of an administrative body, the courts should suspend 
judicial process until that administrative body has had the opportunity to address the issue in question.”). 
 95 Id. at 471.  
 96 The commencement of a bankruptcy case creates a bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012). 
Property of the estate includes “all legal or equitable interests . . . in property” held by the debtor “as of 
commencement of the case.” Id. The phrase “legal or equitable interests” in property includes “every 
conceivable interest of the debtor, future, nonpossesssory, contingent, speculative, and derivative.” In re 
Yonikus, 996 F.2d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Although § 541(a) defines what interests of the 
debtor become property of the estate, applicable non-bankruptcy law, usually state law, determines the 
existence and scope of the debtor’s interest in a particular asset as of commencement of the case. Butner v. 
United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (“Property interests are created and defined by state law.”); McCarthy, 
Johnson & Miller v. N. Bay Plumbing, Inc. (In re Pettit), 217 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, courts 
have held that the scope of § 541(a) includes “contingent future payments that were subject to a condition 
precedent on the date of bankruptcy.” In re Bagen, 186 B.R. 824, 829 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing H.R. 
Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 175–76 (1977)), aff’d, 201 B.R. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). However, courts are 
split on whether government medical payments, such as Medicare or Medicaid, constitute “property.” 
Compare Sulphur Manor, Inc. v. Burwell, No. CIV-15-250, 2015 WL 4409062, at *2 (E.D. Okla. July 20, 
2015) (emphasis added) (quoting Geriatrics, Inc. v. Harris, 640 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1981)) (“Medicaid 
providers do not have a property right to continued enrollment as a qualified provider.”), with First Am. Health 
Care of Ga., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 208 B.R. 985, 990 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996), vacated 
and superseded, No. 96-2007, 1996 WL 282149 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 1996) (“First American is entitled 
to bi-weekly PIPs because it continues to provide reimbursable services to Medicare beneficiaries under the 
Provider Agreements.”). Section 541(c)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code expressly states that any “interest of the 
debtor in property becomes property of the [debtor’s] estate . . . notwithstanding any provision in an 
agreement . . . or applicable nonbankruptcy law that restricts or conditions transfer of such interest by the 
debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(A). Additionally, § 542(b) requires that “an entity that owes a debt that is 
property of the estate and that is matured, payable on demand, or payable on order, shall pay such debt to, or 
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debtor going out of business because its Medicare payments stopped and it 
could not appeal quickly enough to remain in operation will result in 
“precluding” review of the debtor’s claims or merely “postpone” it,97 whether 
the government will be harmed if it is not able to be the first to review and 
decide the debtor’s claims,98 and whether permitting such jurisdiction will 
encourage bankruptcy filings simply to avoid the agency’s review process.99 
In 2015, two significant bankruptcy court opinions involving the 
termination of Medicare payments and the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction in 
light of § 405(h) were issued: In re Bayou Shores100 and Nurses’ Registry & 
Home Health Corp. v. Burwell.101 As discussed in more detail below, both 
found that the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction is not barred by § 405(h).  
B. The In re Bayou Shores Decisions 
1. The Facts of Bayou Shores 
Bayou Shores involved a skilled nursing facility (“SNF”) that was facing 
termination from the Medicare program, and, by extension, being forced to 
 
on the order of, the trustee, except to the extent that such debt may be offset under section 553 of [the 
Bankruptcy Code] against a claim against the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 542(b). 
 97 See, e.g., Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 19 (2000). 
 98 In re Healthback, L.L.C., 226 B.R. 464, 472 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998), vacated, No. 97-22616, 1999 
WL 35012949 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. May 28, 1999) (“[A]dministrative inconvenience is not grounds for 
denying debtors their statutory rights, as a matter of due process. Thus, even though the exercise of this court’s 
jurisdiction might cause administrative difficulties for the Department of Health and Human Services, these 
difficulties are not sufficient grounds for denying jurisdiction.” (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 
690 (1973); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 506–07 (1975))); First Am. Health Care of Ga., Inc. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 208 B.R. 985, 991 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996), vacated and superseded, No. 96-
2007, 1996 WL 282149 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 1996) (“If the relief sought by Parent and its providers is 
not granted, the Debtors are out of business, its approximately 15,000 employees will be out of work, and 
approximately 32,000 patients will be without, at least temporarily, needed home health care services. 
Conversely, the potential harm to the Defendants, if any, is completely pecuniary, does not affect people’s 
health and well-being, is less immediate in effect, and more easily corrected at a later date than the sudden 
termination of health care services to infirm, disabled, or poor people.”). 
 99 Healthback, 226 B.R. at 470, 474 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998) (“[T]here is no indication that the debtor 
filed this bankruptcy case merely to circumvent the administrative requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 405 to obtain 
‘judicial review’ of the withholding. . . . It seems highly improbable to this court that every home health care 
provider will declare bankruptcy for the purpose of avoiding the Medicare administrative requirements in 
response to this court exercising jurisdiction in this case.”). 
 100 525 B.R. 160, 161 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014). Although In re Bayou Shores presents interesting issues 
related to the automatic stay and executory contracts, among others, this Article will only discuss whether 
bankruptcy courts can be used to avoid fatal delay in obtaining judicial review of CMS’s decisions. 
 101 533 B.R. 590 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2015). 
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close its doors.102 The debtor operated a 159-bed SNF for patients with serious 
psychiatric conditions in St. Petersburg, Florida.103 The vast majority—over 90 
percent—of the debtor’s revenue was derived from Medicare and Medicaid.104 
Between February and July of 2014, the debtor was cited on three separate 
occasions for noncompliance with Medicare Program requirements.105 The 
debtor immediately cured the first two citations and CMS found the debtor to 
be in substantial compliance. Thereafter, the debtor also cured the third 
deficiency and hired an outside consultant to conduct a comprehensive review 
of the debtor’s corrective measures.106 Nevertheless, CMS did not visit the 
facility and instead elected to terminate the SNF’s Medicare Provider 
Agreement.107 Although the debtor appealed the decision to terminate, that 
appeal did not prevent CMS from denying payments.108 On August 1, 2014, 
two days before the provider agreements were going to be terminated, the 
debtor filed a lawsuit in the District Court for the Middle District of Florida 
seeking an injunction to prohibit the termination of the provider agreement.109 
On the same day, the district court entered a temporary restraining order 
(“TRO”) prohibiting the termination of the agreements until August 15, 
2014.110 However, once the government briefed the district court on the 
administrative exhaustion requirements described above, the district court 
dissolved the TRO.111 
2. The Bankruptcy Court’s Decision Pertaining to Bankruptcy Jurisdiction 
over Medicare Matters 
Unable to pay its bills, the debtor filed a chapter 11 petition and sought an 
order preventing CMS from terminating the Medicare Provider Agreement 
between the debtor and the Medicare Program. The bankruptcy court granted 
that motion, and the debtor quickly filed a plan of reorganization and sought its 
confirmation. In its objection to confirmation, CMS argued that the bankruptcy 
court could not take jurisdiction over the Medicare disputes unless and until 
 
 102 Bayou Shores, 525 B.R. 160. 
 103 Id. at 161. 
 104 Id. at 162. 
 105 Id. at 163. 
 106 Id. at 164. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 164–65. 
 111 See Bayou Shores SNF, LLC v. Burwell, No. 8:14-cv-1849-T-33MAP, 2014 WL 4101761, at *8–10 
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2014). 
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the debtor exhausted its administrative remedies, relying on the Medicare 
statutes described above. The bankruptcy court rejected that argument and 
confirmed the plan over CMS’s objection.112 The bankruptcy court ruled that it 
had jurisdiction because the plain language of § 405(h) did not restrict 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334. The bankruptcy court referenced a similar 
decision in First American Health Care of Georgia, Inc. v. HHS,113 although 
noting that this decision had been vacated because of a subsequent settlement 
between the parties. 
3. The District Court’s Decision Pertaining to Bankruptcy Jurisdiction 
over Medicare Matters 
HHS appealed the bankruptcy court’s order confirming the debtor’s plan to 
the district court. The appeal of the confirmation order raised the jurisdictional 
issue of whether § 405(h) precluded the bankruptcy court from taking any 
action related to the Medicare Provider Agreement. In ruling on the appeals, 
the district court made several conclusions. First, “the bankruptcy court erred 
because as a matter of law the jurisdictional bar in Section 405(h) precluded 
the Bankruptcy Court from delaying or preventing the effect of CMS 
determination that the provider agreements should be terminated.”114 Second, 
the bankruptcy court’s decision that it had jurisdiction under §  1334 was in 
error because it ignored the jurisdictional bar provided for in the Medicare Act, 
and that “[t]he Bankruptcy Court exceeded its subject matter jurisdiction when 
it interfered with CMS termination of the provider agreements.”115 Third, that 
“[t]here is no jurisdiction for a court to interpose itself in a provider’s 
termination from the Medicare and Medicaid programs except to provide 
judicial review under Section 405(g) only after administrative remedies have 
been exhausted and the Secretary has issued a final agency decision.”116 The 
district court, therefore, ruled that the bankruptcy court lacked the jurisdiction 
because of the requirement for exhaustion of administrative remedies included 
in § 405(h). 
 
 112 Michael Nordskog, Nursing Homes Chapter 11 Plan Ruled Feasible Despite Medicare Problems, 
WESTLAW Bankruptcy Daily Briefing, Jan. 8, 2015, at 2015 WL 94779. 
 113 208 B.R. 985 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996), vacated and superseded, No. 96-2007, 1996 WL 282149 
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 1996). 
 114 Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Bayou Shores SNF, LLC (In re Bayou Shores SNF, LLC), 533 
B.R. 337, 340 (M.D. Fla. 2015). 
 115 Id. at 341. 
 116 Id. 
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4. Bayou Shores’s Appeal 
The debtor appealed the district court’s ruling to the Eleventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals and moved to stay the termination of its Medicare payments 
pending the appeal. Although the Eleventh Circuit denied the stay, the district 
court granted it after Bayou Shores filed an emergency motion. In so holding, 
the district court noted: 
Bayou Shores presented ample evidence that absent a stay it and its 
patients, employees, and staff will suffer irreparable damage. The 
Court finds that if the stay is not continued, Bayou Shores will no 
longer be able to operate and will be forced to discharge its patients 
and terminate its staff. Notably, this evidence also relates to the 
public interest, an interest that is highly relevant here because it 
involves the patients and their family. 
*** 
Medicare and Medicaid are required under both federal and state law 
to pay for the care of Bayou Shores’ patients regardless of where they 
reside, whether it be at Bayou Shores or at any other nursing home.117 
** * 
As Bayou Shores noted, there is a significant factor of human dignity 
at issue here that this Court cannot ignore. Bayou Shores’ patients 
are comfortable, they know the staff, they have the same routines, 
and they retain some dignity and independence from this comfort and 
familiarity. It would be draconian to disrupt their dignity based on a 
jurisdictional debate that has resulted in significant contrary opinions 
among the circuit courts and the lower courts.118 
Curiously, the district court highlighted the very policy reasons for 
permitting the speedy resolution of a debtor’s Medicare disputes in a 
bankruptcy court, rather than through the Medicare appeals process, which 
would similarly cause providers to shutter their doors and harm their patients.  
The case is currently pending in the Eleventh Circuit. 
 
 117 In re Bayou Shores SNF, LLC, No. 8:14-BK-9521-MGW, 2015 WL 6502704, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 
27, 2015). 
 118  Id. at *3 (emphasis added). 
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C. The Nurses’ Registry & Home Health Corp. Decision 
In Nurses’ Registry & Home Health Corp. v. Burwell, the bankruptcy court 
granted the debtor’s emergency motion for preliminary injunction and 
temporary restraining order enjoining the suspension of debtor’s Medicare 
payments.119 The government filed a motion to stay pending appeal.120 In 
reviewing the defendants’ motion, the bankruptcy court analyzed § 405(h)’s 
jurisdictional bar in the context of the “likelihood of success” factor of the 
preliminary injunction standard.121 
The Nurses’ Registry court ultimately held that the government had a very 
low likelihood of success on the merits of its jurisdictional arguments on 
appeal, and in so doing expressly rejected the “legislative history” line of 
cases.122 To begin, the bankruptcy court held that the debtor fell within an 
exception to § 405(h)’s jurisdictional bar because waiting for the Medicare 
review process to finish would have caused the debtor to “become defunct” 
and resulted in “no judicial review of its claims.”123 The bankruptcy court then 
turned to the legislative history arguments. First, the bankruptcy court held 
that, even if the change in § 405(h) from § 41 to §§ 1331 and 1346 was a 
“scrivener’s error,” the court did not have the power to correct that error and 
enforce § 405(h) as barring all of § 41’s jurisdictional grants, including 
bankruptcy.124 Second, the bankruptcy court noted that: 
[A]t least several of the technical amendments Congress enacted in 
the DRA made undeniably substantive changes to Social Security and 
Medicare, belying Congress’s blanket assertion that none of the 
technical amendments were intended to affect any preexisting rights 
or interpretations, and thus, the suggestion to the contrary in the 
legislative history could not be given credence.125 
 
 119 533 B.R. 590, 591 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2015). 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 592. 
 122 Id. at 592–93, 594–96. 
 123 Id. at 593 (“Had this Court waited for the Medicare process to play itself out while Medicare continued 
to suspend payments, the Debtor would have become defunct, and the Debtor would never have been heard on 
its request for turnover. Thus, channeling the Debtor’s claims through the agency would mean no judicial 
review of its claims at all.”). 
 124 Id. at 595 (“If Congress hoped to bar all federal jurisdiction over unexhausted Medicare claims but 
mistakenly believed it could do so by only barring § 1331 and § 1346 jurisdiction, this Court cannot correct 
their mistake.”). 
 125 Id. at 595–96. 
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The Nurses’ Registry court highlighted, as an example, the repealing of “an 
entire title of the SSA, Title XIII, which provided a program of unemployment 
benefits for federal seamen,” and noted that, “[i]f the DRA’s technical 
amendments truly did not ‘chang[e] or affect[ ] any right,’ the Reconversion 
Unemployment Benefits for Seamen program is still federal law.”126 
As discussed in more detail below, the interpretation and application of 
§ 405(h) by the courts in Bayou Shores and Nurses’ Registry should be more 
widely followed, while the so-called legislative history rationale should be 
abandoned. If Congress does not want to provide bankruptcy courts with 
jurisdiction over pre-exhaustion review of a debtor-hospital’s Medicare claims, 
it should so legislate. 
IV. SECTION 405(h)’S “ARISING UNDER” JURISDICTION 
For § 405(h) to prevent a court from exercising jurisdiction over a 
hospital’s Medicare appeal, three conjunctive elements must be satisfied:  
(1) the claims must arise under the Medicare Act, (2) the party must be seeking 
“judicial review,” and (3) the action must be brought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 
or 1346.127 However, the Bankruptcy Code has its own jurisdictional statute 
that confers exclusive jurisdiction to the district and bankruptcy courts over 
cases “arising under” the Bankruptcy Code and involving the debtor’s 
property.128 The Bankruptcy Code’s exclusive jurisdictional grant, combined 
with its fundamental purpose of providing debtors with an opportunity to have 
a “fresh start,” makes it clear that it—and not the Medicare Act—should 
govern who determines a debtor’s disputes with Medicare. 
Claims “arise under” the Medicare Act when their resolution is 
“inextricably intertwined” with benefits determinations129 and when their 
“standing and substantive bas[e]s” are created by the Medicare Act.130 In a 
 
 126 Id. at 596; see also discussion infra at note 225. 
 127 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (2015); In re Healthback L.L.C., 226 B.R. 464, 470 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998), 
vacated, No. 97-22616, 1999 WL 35012949 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. May 28, 1999). 
 128 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(a), (b) & (e) (2015). 
 129 Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 621–24 (1984). 
 130 Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 760–61 (1975); see also In re St. Johns Home Health Agency, Inc., 
173 B.R. 238, 244 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994) (quoting V.N.A. of Greater Tift Cty. v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 1020, 
1025 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied 466 U.S. 936 (1984)) (“The central target of § 405(h) preclusion is ‘any 
action envisioning recovery on any claim emanating from’ the Medicare Act.”). Courts will not indulge 
“cleverly concealed claims for benefits” that, by means of a sort of artful pleading, attempt to mask a Medicare 
benefits claim behind some other cause of action. Quinones v. UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., No. CIV. 14-00497 
LEK, 2015 WL 3965961, at *3 (D. Haw. June 30, 2015). 
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vacuum, it would appear obvious that a hospital seeking to continue its 
Medicare payments after a CMS termination would “arise under” the Medicare 
Act.131 But when a hospital becomes a debtor, the analysis changes. 
To begin, although § 405(h) is said to prohibit a court’s “judicial review” 
of Medicare decisions, a bankruptcy court exercising jurisdiction over a 
debtor’s estate is not “judicial review” of a Medicare Program decision, but is 
rather an effort to ensure the debtor’s creditors are treated fairly under the 
Bankruptcy Code.132 Thus, the proper view of a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction 
is that of administering the debtor’s estate (which may include Medicare 
payments owed to the debtor) and not a debtor’s improper evasion of the 
Medicare appeals process.133 This conclusion is supported by the very fact that 
the question arises before a bankruptcy court by a debtor; if an otherwise 
solvent hospital wanted merely to challenge a Medicare decision prior to 
exhaustion, it would only be able to do so in a federal district court and would 
not have to file, among other things, a first day declaration134 to explain that it 
is unable to service its debts.135 
The Bankruptcy Code’s “arising under” jurisdictional grant should also 
trump the Medicare Act’s jurisdictional grant because ignoring the former 
when the cessation of Medicare payments is at issue would frustrate the 
Bankruptcy Code’s purpose.136 The same fundamental frustration does not 
exist, however, if the Medicare Act’s jurisdiction is superseded by a 
bankruptcy court. The courts that have found Medicare’s jurisdictional bar 
controlling have done so in the context of the legislative history argument,137 
 
 131 E.g., Timberlawn Mental Health Sys. v. Burwell, No. 3:15-CV-2556-M, 2015 WL 4868842, at *3 
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2015) (In the context of a motion for a temporary restraining order, the court held that 
“[the Hospital’s] claims arise under the Medicare Act because the Hospital seeks to continue its participation 
in the Medicare program pending an administrative appeal of CMS’s termination decision.”). 
 132 Healthback, 226 B.R. at 469–70. 
 133 Id. 
 134 “It is typical (particularly in large bankruptcy cases) for a debtor to file declarations or affirmations in 
support of the first day motions. These declarations [generally are signed] by the debtor’s senior management, 
[and] give the trade creditor important information about the facts and circumstances leading to the bankruptcy 
filing, as well as a preliminary road map for where the case is headed. It will also highlight significant issues 
that may impede the efforts to reorganize.” Jeffrey Baddeley, Managing Trade Credit to Struggling 
Companies, CORP. FIN. REV., May/June 2013, at 16, 19. 
 135 See Healthback, 226 B.R. at 470. 
 136 Courts should be reluctant to interpret a statute in a way that frustrates its purpose. See King v. 
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2484 (2015) (“Here, the [Affordable Care Act’s] statutory scheme compels us to 
reject petitioner’s interpretation because it would destabilize the individual insurance market in any State with 
a Federal Exchange, and likely create the very ‘death spirals’ that Congress designed the Act to avoid.”). 
 137 E.g., In re Hosp. Staffing Servs., Inc., 258 B.R. 53, 56 (S.D. Fla. 2000). 
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but that argument presumes—without support—that in the same breath 
Congress also intended to exclude a class of debtors (those who rely on 
Medicare payments to remain solvent) from bankruptcy protection.138 If a 
hospital relies on Medicare payments to survive and those Medicare payments 
stop, the hospital shuts down, and the effects ripple throughout its patients, 
service providers, and staff.139 To prevent such a (potentially unnecessary) 
result, the Bankruptcy Code exists to provide distressed businesses “breathing 
space” in which they can reorganize with assistance from the bankruptcy 
courts.140 This is why bankruptcy (and district) courts have broad and 
exclusive jurisdiction over debtors and their assets and liabilities—without 
which external entities, including governmental entities such as CMS, would 
be able to interfere with the restructuring process and impinge on a debtor’s 
breathing space. Indeed, such interference is expressly prohibited by 
protections like the automatic stay, which pauses all litigations pending against 
a debtor, and is a protection that would be rendered meaningless if Medicare 
jurisdiction governed a debtor’s dispute with Medicare because the debtor 
 
 138 See First Am. Health Care of Ga., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 208 B.R. 985, 990 
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996), vacated and superseded, No. 96-2007, 1996 WL 282149 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 
1996) (“First American is entitled to bi-weekly PIPs because it continues to provide reimbursable services to 
Medicare beneficiaries under the Provider Agreements.”). 
 139 The factual background in U.S. ex rel. Sarasola v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1292, 1296–97  
(11th Cir. 2003) aptly sums up the series of events: 
The court denied St. Johns’s motion in a written order dated September 23, 1994. It agreed with 
the Secretary that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the motion because St. Johns had not 
exhausted its administrative remedies. Assuming that it had jurisdiction, the court added, it could 
not “grant effective relief . . . under 11 U.S.C. § 365 without fundamentally and impermissibly 
altering the contractual relationship between St. Johns and the Secretary which incorporates the 
statutory and administrative scheme imposed by the Medicare Program.” The court’s decision 
was St. Johns’s death knell. On November 10, 1994, the court entered an order approving the sale 
of St. Johns’s assets (except the above-mentioned lawsuit pending against the Secretary and 
CMS) to Amitan Health Services, Inc. On August 21, 1995, St. Johns moved the court to convert 
its Chapter 11 case to a Chapter 7 liquidation. The court granted its motion. 
(emphasis added). Accord Livingston Care Ctr., Inc. v. United States, No. 89-40200-FL, 1990 WL 125000, at 
*1 (E.D. Mich. May 31, 1990), aff’d, 934 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Plaintiff’s status as Medicaid provider 
was automatically terminated as well, which resulted in extensive lost revenues to plaintiff and its eventual 
bankruptcy.” (emphasis added)); see also Sulphur Manor, Inc. v. Burwell, No. CIV-15-250-RAW, 2015 WL 
4409062, at *3 (E.D. Okla. July 20, 2015) (analyzing irreparable injury in a preliminary injunction motion); 
Healthback, 226 B.R. at 471 n.8; First Am. Health Care of Ga., 208 B.R. at 989–90; In re Tidewater Mem’l 
Hosp., 106 B.R. 876, 880 (Bankr. E.D.Va. 1989) (analyzing the automatic stay). 
 140 See In re Town & Country Home Nursing Servs., Inc., 963 F.2d 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The 
language of section 1334(b) grants jurisdiction to the district court, and therefore to the bankruptcy court, over 
civil proceedings related to bankruptcy and accords with the intent of Congress to bring all bankruptcy-related 
litigation within the umbrella of the district court, at least as an initial matter, irrespective of congressional 
statements to the contrary in the context of other specialized litigation.”). 
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would then be litigating its rights before both the bankruptcy court and the 
Medicare ALJs.141 
Moreover, finding that the Bankruptcy Code’s exclusive jurisdictional grant 
applies to a debtor’s Medicare Program payments and disputes does not 
frustrate the purpose of the Medicare Act. To begin, the argument that it would 
negatively impact the Medicare ALJs’ ability to gain expertise rings hollow.142 
Medicare ALJs have their hands full with Medicare appeals as it is, and 
bankruptcy judges are competent to the task of adjudicating a wide variety of 
legal claims—Medicare questions are no different.143 In addition, relieving 
Medicare of its jurisdiction over this small subsection of its providers will not 
harm the Medicare Act’s purpose. Medicare will continue to function as it 
normally does, and in fact, given the backlog of Medicare appeals, losing this 
jurisdiction may actually be a relief to a system that is already burdened to the 
breaking point.144 Indeed, resolution of the dispute could happen both earlier 
and more expeditiously if administered by a bankruptcy judge, preserving the 
Medicare Program’s scarce administrative resources. 
Even if a court were to find that Medicare’s jurisdictional grant trumps the 
Bankruptcy Code’s, bankruptcy courts would still be the proper venue to 
resolve a debtor’s Medicare disputes because § 405(h) does not apply to bar a 
bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction. 
 
 141 See, e.g., In re Univ. Med. Ctr., Inc., 973 F.2d 1065, 1073 (3d Cir. 1992); In re Rusnak, 184 B.R. 459, 
462–63 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995); Tidewater Mem’l Hosp., 106 B.R. at 880 (“Here, however, the Government’s 
action in apparent violation of the automatic stay provisions of § 362 could well prevent the debtor from 
having an opportunity for rehabilitation and reorganization. There is an urgency here which goes beyond the 
domain of Medicare law, and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies should not be allowed to 
frustrate the clearly stated goals of the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
 142 In re St. Mary Hosp., 123 B.R. 14, 17 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (“Moreover, a broad reading of section 405(h) 
puts its interpretation in accord with Congress’ intent to permit the Secretary in Medicare disputes to develop 
the record and base decisions upon his unique expertise in the health care field.”). 
 143 See, e.g., Healthback, 226 B.R. at 472 n.10 (“Under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) the court has the power to 
issue any order[,] process[,] or judgment necessary or appropriate to execute the provisions of Title 11. In 
almost all bankruptcy cases, the creditors and parties are inconvenienced to some degree. This court perceives 
no reason why the Department of Health and Human Services should receive special consideration in this 
context.”); First Am. Health Care of Ga., 208 B.R. at 991 (observing that the government is actually better off 
if the debtor continues receiving its payments because that increases its chances of exiting bankruptcy and 
repaying the government). 
 144 Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals Workloads: Hearing on Exploring Medicare Appeal Reform 
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform & the Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Healthcare & 
Entitlements, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Nancy J. Griswold, Chief A.L.J., Office of Medicare Hearings 
and Appeals), www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2014/07/t20140710a.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2015). 
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V. INTERPRETING MEDICARE’S JURISDICTIONAL BAR 
A. Discussion of Plain Language Argument 
It is hornbook law that unambiguous language in a statute is given its plain 
meaning: “[T]he plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to 
be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense that nothing but the exigency 
of a hard case and the ingenuity and study of an acute and powerful intellect 
would discover.”145 
1. The Plain Language of 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) 
The words Congress wrote into law in § 405(h) only bar federal court 
jurisdiction if the dispute arises under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 or 1346; bankruptcy 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 is not referenced. The Supreme Court 
observed as much in Heckler v. Ringer, “The third sentence of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 405(h), made applicable to the Medicare Act by 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii, provides 
that § 405(g), to the exclusion of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, is the sole avenue for 
judicial review for all “claim[s] arising under” the Medicare Act[,]”146 and 
again in Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., “The statute 
[§ 405(h)] plainly bars § 1331 review . . . .”147 The plain meaning of § 405(h)’s 
jurisdictional limitations has been adopted by both the Third148 and Ninth 
Circuits,149 as well as by numerous district150 and bankruptcy courts,151 and has 
 
 145 Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364, 370 (1925); see also E.P.A. v. EME Homer City 
Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1600–01 (2014) (quoting Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., Div. of 
Cadence Industries Corp., 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989)) (“[A] reviewing court’s task is to apply the text of the 
statute, not to improve upon it.”); Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 460 (2002); United States v. 
Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989); In re Kolich, 328 F.3d 406, 409 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The plain 
meaning of legislation should be conclusive . . . .”). 
 146 466 U.S. 602, 614–15 (1984) (emphasis added). 
 147 529 U.S. 1, 10 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 148 In re Univ. Med. Ctr., Inc., 973 F.2d 1065, 1072 (3d Cir. 1992).  
 149 In re Town & Country Home Nursing Servs., Inc., 963 F.2d 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 150 E.g., Cal. Clinical Lab. Ass’n v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 14-CV-0673, 2015 WL 
2393571, at *10 (D.D.C. May 20, 2015). 
 151 In re Nurses’ Registry & Home Health Corp., 533 B.R. 590, 595 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2015); In re Bayou 
Shores SNF, LLC, 525 B.R. 160, 166 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014); In re Slater Health Ctr., Inc., 294 B.R. 423, 
428 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2003), vacated in part, 306 B.R. 20 (D.R.I. 2004), aff’d, 398 F.3d 98 (1st Cir. 2005); First 
Am. Health Care of Ga., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 208 B.R. 985, 989 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 
1996), vacated and superseded, No. 96-2007, 1996 WL 282149 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 1996); In re 
Healthmaster Home Health Care, Inc., No. 95-01031A, 1995 WL 928920, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Apr. 13, 
1995); In re Shelby Cty. Healthcare Servs. of AL, Inc., 80 B.R. 555, 560 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987). 
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gone unchanged by Congress for over twenty years.152 Although § 405(h) and 
§  1334 are “incongruous,” it is not “absurd” to have a bankruptcy exception 
to Medicare’s exhaustion requirement,153 particularly in light of the harm that 
can arise to the debtor due to stopped Medicare payments during the lengthy 
Medicare review process.154 Thus, courts should not “allow[] ambiguous 
legislative history to muddy clear statutory language.”155 
The Supreme Court recently addressed statutory construction in the health 
care context in King v. Burwell,156 and the Court’s analytical framework in 
both the majority’s opinion and Justice Scalia’s dissent (both of which capture 
the thrust of the Court’s plain language doctrine) strongly support applying 
§ 405(h) based on its plain language. In King, the Court was charged with 
interpreting the short phrase, “established by the State,” in the Affordable Care 
Act, and the outcome of which would either preserve or undermine the entire 
statutory scheme.157 The Court chose preservation because it was 
“implausible” that Congress would have written the term such that it would 
cause a “death spiral” and undermine the entire Affordable Care Act.158 In so 
holding, the Court determined that although the words appeared clear on the 
surface, they became ambiguous when viewed in light of the entire statute.159 
The Court reasoned that, “the words of a statute must be read in their context 
and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme,” and only then 
can they be deemed non-ambiguous and subject to enforcement based on their 
plain meaning.160 
Here, neither the context of the Social Security Act nor the Medicare Act 
render § 405(h)’s jurisdictional grant over 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1346 
ambiguous. This is because the structures of the acts and their pertinent 
sections do not include contradictory cross-references or jurisdictional terms 
that, if defined one way would undermine the entirety of either the Medicare or 
Social Security Acts. If anything, relieving the Medicare Program of some of 
its appellate review jurisdiction and placing it with the bankruptcy courts for 
 
 152 In re Nurses’ Registry & Home Health Corp., 533 B.R. 590, 595  (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2015). 
 153 Id. 
 154 See supra at note 139; see also, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Sarasola v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1292, 1296–
97 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 155 Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 572 (2011). 
 156 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 157 Id. at 2489. 
 158 Id. at 2492–94. 
 159 Id. at 2490–91. 
 160 Id. at 2492. 
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debtors might actually aid the agency in the execution of its duties, alleviating 
some of the burden for its strained system resources to focus on the existing, 
crippling backlog of cases currently pending review therein.161 
And, of course, Justice Scalia’s dissent propounding the unassailable merits 
of the Court’s well-established plain language doctrine supports a reading of 
§ 405(h) that limits its jurisdictional bar to §§ 1331 and 1346. Justice Scalia 
notes that although “[l]aws often include unusual or mismatched provisions,” 
courts may “not revise legislation just because the text as written creates an 
apparent anomaly.”162 Here, although § 405(h) may have formerly referred to a 
broad jurisdictional provision that included bankruptcy, it currently does not, 
and moreover, as it is presently written, § 405(h) contains no anomalies or 
references to other mismatched provisions—it clearly states that it applies only 
to §§ 1331 and 1346. Justice Scalia’s reasoning continued that, “The purposes 
of a law must be ‘collected chiefly from its words,’ not ‘from extrinsic 
circumstances.’ Only by concentrating on the law’s terms can a judge hope to 
uncover the scheme of the statute, rather than some other scheme that the judge 
thinks desirable.”163 In § 405(h), the words “under § 1331 or 1346 of title 28” 
plainly omit any reference to bankruptcy jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334. 
And finally, he urged that, “[i]f Congress enacted into law something different 
from what it intended, then it should amend the statute to conform to its 
intent.”164 Here, Congress actually did draft something different into law to 
change its operation: previously, § 405(h) cited a broad jurisdictional statute 
that gave widespread reviewing authority to federal courts; now it cites to two 
out of nearly two dozen such jurisdictional grants, many of which were written 
or amended after § 405(h) was updated in 1984. 
 
 161 Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals Workloads: Hearing on Exploring Medicare Appeal Reform 
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform & the Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Healthcare & 
Entitlements, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Nancy J. Griswold, Chief A.L.J., Office of Medicare Hearings 
and Appeals), www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2014/07/t20140710a.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2015). 
 162 Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2500 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 163 Id. at 2503 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 202, 4 L.Ed. 529 
(1819) (Marshall, C.J.)). 
 164 Id. at 2505 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) 
(quoting Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 380 (1962)) (“[O]nly upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ 
of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review.”), abrogated on other 
grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); In re W.J.P. Properties, 149 B.R. 604, 607 (Bankr. C.D. 
Cal. 1992) (citations omitted) (“The Supreme Court has on many occasions stressed that in interpreting 
statutes, the court should first look to the statute. If the statute is clear and unambiguous, the court should 
enforce the statute as written without reference to legislative history.”). 
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2. The Plain Language of 28 U.S.C. § 1334 
The plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1334 is equally clear. Section 1334 
provides the statutory basis for bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction. Specifically, it 
provides exclusive jurisdiction over all cases under title 11 and all property of 
the debtor and the estate, wherever located, to the district courts, which then 
may refer the case to the bankruptcy courts:  
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district 
courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under 
title 11. 
** * 
(e) The district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced or 
is pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction of [] all of the property, 
wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such 
case, and of property of the estate . . . .165  
This structure creates no ambiguity,166 and nothing suggests that this exclusive 
jurisdictional grant cedes to the Medicare Act.167 Courts have thusly employed 
§ 1334’s plain meaning as independent grounds for permitting bankruptcy 
jurisdiction over Medicare disputes.168 The Ninth Circuit has reconciled this 
 
 165 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 166 See Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480. 
 167 See In re Town & Country Home Nursing Servs., Inc., 963 F.2d 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis 
added) (“The language of Section 1334(b) grants jurisdiction to the district court, and therefore to the 
bankruptcy court, over civil proceedings related to bankruptcy and accords with the intent of Congress to bring 
all bankruptcy-related litigation within the umbrella of the district court, at least as an initial matter, 
irrespective of congressional statements to the contrary in the context of other specialized litigation.”). 
Although the Supreme Court stated, “Section 1334(b) concerns the allocation of jurisdiction between 
bankruptcy courts and other ‘courts,’ and, of course, an administrative agency such as the Board is not a 
‘court’” in Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 41–42 (1991), that decision 
does not apply to the present discussion because there the Board’s decision had not yet been rendered, and the 
debtor’s estate had therefore not yet been harmed. Here, CMS would have already stopped payments to the 
hospital-debtor, thereby harming the debtor’s estate—a situation expressly carved out of the MCorp. Court’s 
decision based on 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d): “Moreover, contrary to MCorp’s contention, the prosecution of the 
Board proceedings, prior to the entry of a final order and prior to the commencement of any enforcement 
action, seems unlikely to impair the Bankruptcy Court's exclusive jurisdiction over the property of the estate 
protected by 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d).” Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 42 
(1991) (emphasis added); see also Sunflower Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 603 F.2d 791, 796 
(10th Cir. 1979) (implying doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable only when agency 
has exclusive jurisdiction). 
 168 E.g., In re Slater Health Ctr., Inc., 398 F.3d 98 (1st Cir. 2004) (affirming decision that bankruptcy 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 provides an independent basis for jurisdiction); In re Town & Country 
Home Nursing, 963 F.2d at 1154; see also In re Univ. Med. Ctr., Inc., 973 F.2d 1065, 1072 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(“Because we agree . . . that the Bankruptcy Code supplies an independent basis for jurisdiction in this case, 
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conclusion with its holdings that have excluded other jurisdictional grants from  
§ 405(h). In Do Sung Uhm v. Humana, Inc.,169 the court noted that although 
Kaiser v. Blue Cross of California170 held that the absence of any reference to 
42 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction) in § 405(h) was irrelevant and 
diversity jurisdiction was still barred, § 1334’s “broad jurisdictional grant over 
all matters conceivably having an effect on the bankruptcy estate” ultimately 
carried the day.171 In short, Do Sung Uhm correctly concluded that bankruptcy 
is special, which is consistent with the Bankruptcy Code’s plain language and 
purpose, neither of which are present in a dispute based on diversity 
jurisdiction where neither party is insolvent. This outcome is consistent with 
the rule of statutory construction that “when two statutes are capable of 
coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed 
Congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective”172 because 
the Medicare Act and Bankruptcy Code “coexist” due to Medicare’s 
jurisdictional carve-out for bankruptcy courts in §  405(h). 
 
we reject the Secretary’s arguments and find that the district and bankruptcy courts properly had jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 and 1334 and that we may properly exercise jurisdiction over this appeal under 
28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291.”). Nor does § 1334(b)’s “original but not exclusive” language for “all civil 
proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11” change the analysis. See 
Excel Home Care, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 316 B.R. 565, 572 (D. Mass. 2004) (“The 
statute itself provides that “unless indicated otherwise by another Act of Congress,” the district courts are 
endowed with “original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising 
in or related to cases under title 11.”). As the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit 
explains: 
Essentially all litigation within a bankruptcy case is a “civil proceeding” within § 1334(b) 
“arising under, arising in, or related to” jurisdiction, which jurisdiction is concurrent with state 
courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). Although such jurisdiction is concurrent with state courts, the 
automatic stay renders state jurisdiction more theoretical than real until after the case is closed. 
11 U.S.C. § 362. As one would expect, the decisions construing § 1334(b) deal with how to draw 
the line at the outer fringe of “related to” matters. Most circuits agree that the test of “related to” 
jurisdiction is whether the outcome of the proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the 
estate being administered in bankruptcy. . . . In short, virtually every act a bankruptcy judge is 
called upon to perform in a judicial capacity is a “civil proceeding” within § 1334(b). 
In re Menk, 241 B.R. 896, 908–09 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999). 
 169 620 F.3d 1134, 1140 n.11 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 170 347 F.3d 1107, 1115 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 171 Do Sung Uhm, 620 F.3d at 1140 n.11. 
 172 J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 143 (2001). 
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3. Enforcing § 405(h) Based on Its Plain Language Is Consistent with the 
Bankruptcy Code’s Purpose 
That § 405(h)’s plain language governs its interpretation is supported by 
the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code: “The purpose of Chapter 11 
reorganization is to assist financially distressed business enterprises by 
providing them with breathing space in which to return to a viable state.”173 
Absent such breathing space, a debtor may be forced to cease its operations, 
rendering virtually impossible a return to a viable state. The problem is 
particularly acute for hospital-debtors that rely on Medicare payments and 
cannot have their Medicare disputes appealed quickly enough to keep 
operating.174 
A debtor’s breathing space is created by the bankruptcy court’s exclusive 
jurisdiction over its estate. If not for this exclusive jurisdiction, the debtor may 
be called to defend its assets and debts in multiple courts (here, the Medicare 
appeals labyrinth),175 which would create a race to the courthouse for its 
creditors and, more importantly, distract the debtor from the important task of 
successful reorganization. Indeed, “[o]ne of the primary purposes of revising 
the statutory grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts [in 1978] was the 
elimination of frequent, time-consuming, and expensive litigation of the 
question whether the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction of a particular 
proceeding.”176 Thus, § 1334’s exclusivity provision is susceptible to little 
legislative weakness: bankruptcy jurisdiction is exclusive “irrespective of 
congressional statements to the contrary in the context of specialized 
legislation,” and “in the absence of clear and convincing evidence of 
 
 173 In re Golden Ocala P’ship, 50 B.R. 552, 557 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985). 
 174 In re Tidewater Mem’l Hosp., 106 B.R. 876, 880 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989) (“Here, however, the 
Government’s action in apparent violation of the automatic stay provisions of § 362 could well prevent the 
debtor from having an opportunity for rehabilitation and reorganization. There is an urgency here which goes 
beyond the domain of Medicare law, and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies should not be 
allowed to frustrate the clearly stated goals of the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
 175 To require a hospital to complete the “complex and time-consuming maze of the [Medicare] 
administrative review process” as a prerequisite to obtaining bankruptcy relief will “virtually ignore the 
purpose of the changes in the jurisdictional grant enacted in the [1978] Reform Act elimination of delay and 
expense as a barrier to a successful reorganization.” In re Clawson Med., Rehab. & Pain Care Ctr., P.C., 9 
B.R. 644, 49 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.), rev’d, 12 B.R. 647 (E.D. Mich. 1981). 
 176 Clawson, 9 B.R. at 648–49. 
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legislative intent to preclude or condition [a bankruptcy c]ourt’s jurisdiction, 
no further barriers will be erected.”177 
If a hospital is not provided with breathing space and Medicare is allowed 
to stop its payments while the hospital appeals an adverse CMS decision, the 
hospital may well run out of money and be forced to stop operating before the 
appeals process is complete.178 True, § 405(h) is meant to act as a channeling 
requirement where virtually all challenges to Medicare decisions go through 
the agency.179 This scheme becomes problematic, however, when adhering to it 
means “killing the patient to cure the disease.”180 And killing the patient can be 
precisely what happens when a court requires hospitals to appeal a decision 
that stops their essential Medicare payments through the Medicare appeals 
process: if the hospital dies before its Medicare appeal can be heard, it 
effectively will have lost its opportunity for meaningful judicial review,181 and 
in turn, it will be difficult or impossible to reorganize.182 Consequently, 
 
 177 Id. at 648 (citing Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373 (1974); Chelsea Comm. Hosp., SNF v. Mich. 
Blue Cross Ass’n, 630 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1980); Wayne St. Univ. v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627, 632 (6th Cir. 
1980)). 
 178 See First Am. Health Care of Ga., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 208 B.R. 985, 989–90 
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996), vacated and superseded, No. 96-2007, 1996 WL 282149 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 
1996). 
 179 Nat’l Ass’n for Home Care & Hospice, Inc. v. Burwell, 77 F.Supp.3d 103, 109 (D.D.C. 2015). 
 180 See In re Jewish Mem’l Hosp., 13 B.R. 417, 420 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 181 E.g., Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 22–23 (2000) (emphasis omitted) 
(“Rather, the question is whether, as applied generally to those covered by a particular statutory provision, 
hardship likely found in many cases turns what appears to be simply a channeling requirement into complete 
preclusion of judicial review.”); Frontier Health Inc. v. Shalala, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1193 (E.D. Tenn. 2000) 
(“If Woodridge Hospital were forced to close down before its administrative remedies had been exhausted, it 
would not be in a position to seek judicial review at the close of the administrative process.”). Outside of the 
bankruptcy context, courts are unlikely to find this reasoning persuasive. See, e.g., Fox Ins. Co v. Sebelius, 381 
F. App’x 93, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Fox’s claimed financial harm does not constitute the circumstances in 
which the CMS’s actions and their effects on Fox are subject to ‘no review at all.’ Illinois Council does not 
hold that where a party may suffer economic hardship it may sidestep administrative review.”); Sulphur 
Manor, Inc. v. Burwell, No. CIV-15-250-RAW, 2015 WL 4409062, at *3 (E.D. Okla. July 20, 2015); Cal. 
Clinical Lab. Ass’n v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 14-CV-0673, 2015 WL 2393571, at *10 (D.D.C. 
May 20, 2015). However, bankruptcy courts, employing their expertise on the matters affecting debtors’ 
estates, frequently find otherwise. E.g., U.S. ex rel. Sarasola v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1292, 1296–97 
(11th Cir. 2003); In re Healthback, L.L.C., 226 B.R. 464, 471 n.8 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998), vacated, No. 97-
22616, 1999 WL 35012949 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. May 28, 1999); First Am. Health Care of Ga., 208 B.R. at 
989–90; In re Tidewater Mem’l Hosp., 106 B.R. 876, 880 (Bankr. E.D.Va. 1989). 
 182 See, e.g., Sulphur Manor, 2015 WL 4409062, at *3 (“The court does find a showing of irreparable 
injury in the assertion that plaintiff will go out of business upon termination of the provider agreements . . . .”); 
Healthback, 226 B.R. at 471 n.8 (“In this matter, where there is no timely administrative remedy available to 
the debtor, this court will not require the debtor to, literally, commit suicide to adhere to this rule.”); First Am. 
Health Care of Ga., Inc, 208 B.R. at 989–90; Tidewater Mem’l Hosp., 106 B.R. at 880. 
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patients will have lost their access to care, Medicare will have lost a provider 
that potentially could reorganize and improve, and the hospital’s employees 
will have lost their jobs.183 But “[i]f there is not a potentially viable business in 
place worthy of protection and rehabilitation, the Chapter 11 effort has lost its 
raison d’etre.”184 Because the Bankruptcy Code in general—and chapter 11 in 
particular—exist to prevent the unnecessary shuttering of businesses that are 
temporarily but not irreversibly experiencing hardship, reading the natural 
language of § 405(h) as omitting reference to the Bankruptcy Code’s 
jurisdictional grant in 28 U.S.C. § 1334 fully supports the purpose of the 
Bankruptcy Code.185 
B. Discussion of the “Legislative History” Argument 
The argument that §  405(h), as it is currently written, prevents bankruptcy 
courts from hearing Medicare claims prior to exhaustion of administrative 
remedies is based on explanatory language enacted by Congress when §  405(h) 
was amended in 1984.186 This argument fails for six reasons, summarized here 
and explained in greater detail below. 
First, to the extent § 2664(b) of the Deficit Reduction Act can be read as 
applying only to preclude substantive changes (a conclusion not supported by 
the statute’s language), jurisdictional statutes are procedural, not substantive, 
and are therefore not covered by § 2664(b)’s directive. 
Second, the 1948 re-codification of 28 U.S.C. § 41 did include substantive 
changes, and applying § 405(h) in 2015 to a jurisdictional statute dating back 
nearly a century (that includes, for example, a jurisdictional grant for questions 
pertaining to slavery) leads to absurd results. 
 
 183 See, e.g., First Am. Health Care of Ga., Inc., 208 B.R. at 989–90. 
 184 In re Golden Ocala P’ship, 50 B.R. 552, 557 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985). 
 185  This outcome is consistent with other unique provisions in the Bankruptcy Code dealing with 
governmental entities. For example, §  525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits governmental entities from 
denying, revoking, superseding, or refusing to “renew a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar 
grant to, condition such a grant to, discriminate with respect to such a grant against . . . a person that is or has 
been a debtor under” the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a). The similar provisions dealing with private 
employers is much more limited. 11 U.S.C. § 525(b). Section 525(a) has been applied to licenses and 
government contracts and applied to prohibit the Medicare program from refusing to allow entities that have 
been through bankruptcy from future participation as a Medicare provider. See, e.g., In re St. Mary Hosp., 89 
B.R. 503, 504 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988). But see E.H. Sperow, Section 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code Plainly 
Does Not Apply to Medicare Provider Agreements, 34 J. HEALTH L. 487, 487–500 (2001). See generally F.C.C. 
v. NextWave Pers. Commc’ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 302 (2003); In re Stoltz, 315 F.3d 80, 95 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 186 See supra text accompanying notes 7, 11–18; Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 
§ 2664(b), 98 Stat. 1162. 
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Third, since its extraction from § 41, 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (bankruptcy 
jurisdiction) has been amended and expanded several times as part of 
significant revisions to the entire Bankruptcy Code. Ignoring this presumes 
Congress meant to preclude certain individuals and businesses from 
bankruptcy protection—despite a lack of express language so stating—while it 
was at the same time greatly increasing the jurisdictional authority of 
bankruptcy courts. 
Fourth, in addition to the changes to § 405(h), many of the other 
amendments made by Congress in § 2663 of the DRA affected parties’ 
substantive and procedural rights and liabilities. This (combined with the 
second and third reasons above) lends strong evidence to an argument that the 
real scrivener’s error is the overbroad catchall in § 2664(b) that none of the 
250 sub-sections of the U.S. Code that § 2663 amended did so in a way that 
altered a party’s rights or liabilities. 
Fifth, § 2664(b) is labeled “Effective Dates” and ends with the limitation, 
“before that date.” Just eight days “before that date” of the DRA’s enactment, 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1984 was passed, reaffirming the bankruptcy 
court’s exclusive jurisdiction over a debtor’s case and estate. The plain 
language of § 2664(b) therefore prohibits courts from ignoring the rights 
created in the Bankruptcy Reform Act. 
Sixth and finally, even if the Office of Revision Counsel’s change, which 
was then codified by Congress, was a “scrivener’s error,” courts are not 
permitted to correct technical legislative errors. 
1. Jurisdiction Under § 405(h) is Procedural, Not Substantive 
Assuming that § 2664(b) only applies to preclude any substantive changes 
that may be read into § 2663 (a conclusion unsupported by §  2664(b)’s plain 
language), such a preclusion would not apply to prevent alteration to § 405(h) 
because jurisdictional grants are procedural, not substantive. 
As discussed above, Congress expressly enacted the Law Revision 
Counsel’s changes to § 405(h) as part of the DRA.187 As part of that 
 
 187 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2663(a)(4)(D), 98 Stat. 1162 (“Section 205(h) of 
such Act is amended by striking out ‘section 24 of the Judicial Code of the United States’ and inserting in lieu 
thereof ‘section 1331 or 1346 of title 28, United States Code . . . .’”). Changes to a statute by the Law Revision 
Counsel are not binding absent enactment by Congress. 
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legislation, Congress included a provision entitled, “Effective Dates,” which 
stated in § 2664(b) that: 
Except to the extent otherwise specifically provided in this subtitle, 
the amendments made by section 2663 shall be effective on the date 
of the enactment of this Act; but none of such amendments shall be 
construed as changing or affecting any right, liability, status, or 
interpretation which existed (under the provisions of law involved) 
before that date.188 
Beginning in 1990 with Bodimetric Health Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas.,189 
courts have tended to assume, without explanation, that §  2664(b) applies only 
to substantive and not procedural changes.190 However, a close reading of the 
statute and an analysis of its precise terms suggests otherwise. Section 2664(b) 
states, “none of such amendments shall be construed as changing or affecting 
any right, liability, status, or interpretation.”191 By its plain language, the word 
“right” in § 2664 is not qualified. As such, it is equally plausible—and, indeed, 
likely—that “right” includes both substantive and procedural rights. Moreover, 
Black’s Law Dictionary includes a definition for “right,” “substantive right,” 
and “procedural right.”192 
In either event, to the extent that § 2664(b) does refer exclusively to 
substantive changes, it does not apply to §  405(h)’s jurisdictional bar, which is 
procedural in nature.193 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “substantive law” as, 
“[t]he part of law that creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and 
 
 188 Id. § 2664(b) (emphasis added). 
 189 903 F.2d 480, 489 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 190 E.g., Nichole Med. Equip. & Supply, Inc. v. TriCenturion, Inc., 694 F.3d 340, 346 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(citing Bodimetric Health Servs., Inc., 903 F.2d at 489); BP Care, Inc. v. Thompson, 398 F.3d 503, 515 (6th 
Cir. 2005); Midland Psychiatric Associates, Inc. v. United States, 969 F. Supp. 543, 549 (W.D. Mo. 1997), 
aff’d, 145 F.3d 1000 (8th Cir. 1998); Nicole Med. Equip. & Supply, Inc. v. TriCenturion, Inc., No. CIV.A. 10-
389, 2011 WL 1162052, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2011); Reg’l Med. Transp., Inc. v. Highmark, Inc., 541 
F.Supp. 2d 718, 731 (E.D. Pa. 2, 2008); Excel Home Care, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 316 
B.R. 565, 573 (D. Mass. 2004); Allstar Care Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of S.C., 184 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 
1298 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Total Renal Labs., Inc. v. Shalala, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1331 (N.D. Ga. 1999); In re 
Healthback, L.L.C., 226 B.R. 464, 473 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998), vacated, No. 97-22616, 1999 WL 35012949 
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1999); In re House of Mercy, Inc., 353 B.R. 867, 871 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2006); In re AHN 
Homecare, LLC, 222 B.R. 804, 808 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998); In re St. Mary Hosp., 123 B.R. 14, 17 (E.D. Pa. 
1991). 
 191 Deficit Reduction Act § 2664(b).  
 192 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 623–24 (3d pocket ed. 2006). 
 193 See Deficit Reduction Act § 2664(b). 
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powers of the parties.”194 Black’s further defines “right” as, inter alia, 
“[s]omething that is due to a person by just claim, legal guarantee, or moral 
principle,” “[a] power, privilege, or immunity secured to a person by law,” and 
“[a] legally enforceable claim that another will do or will not do a given act; a 
recognized and protected interest the violation of which is a wrong.”195 A 
“substantive right” is, therefore, a “right that can be protected or enforced by 
law; a right of substance rather than form,”196 whereas a “procedural right” is a 
“right that derives from legal or administrative procedure; a right that helps in 
the enforcement of a substantive right.”197 Because jurisdiction, a “court’s 
power to decide a case or issue a decree,”198 merely informs the parties of the 
proper forum, thereby “help[ing] in the enforcement of a substantive right,” 
and does not create, define, or regulate rights—such as those arising under 42 
U.S.C. § 405(h) and 28 U.S.C. § 1334—it is a procedural right, not a 
substantive one.199 And to the extent § 2664(b) can be read to apply only to 
substantive rights, it does not apply to alter the plain meaning of § 405(h).200 
Even if the phrase “none of such amendments shall be construed as 
changing or affecting any right, liability, status, or interpretation” in § 2664(b) 
can be read to apply to both substantive and procedural rights, it still fails to 
bar bankruptcy court jurisdiction over Medicare disputes prior to exhaustion 
under § 405(h), for the reasons outlined below. 
 
 194 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 192, at 686; see also Healthback, 226 B.R. at 473 
(“Substantive law. That part of law which creates, defines, and regulates rights and duties of parties, as 
opposed to ‘adjective, procedural, or remedial law,’ which prescribes method of enforcing the rights or 
obtaining redress for their invasion. The basic law of rights and duties (contract law, criminal law, tort law, 
law of wills, etc.) as opposed to procedural law (law of pleading, law of evidence, law of jurisdiction, etc.).”). 
 195 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 192, at 623–24. 
 196 Id. at 624 (emphasis added). 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. at 393. 
 199 Note, however, that the label “procedural” is not unassailable. When a procedural rule “makes changes 
in remedies, procedures, and evidence[,] such changes can have as profound an impact on behavior outside the 
courtroom as avowedly substantive changes.” Luddington v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225, 229 (7th Cir. 
1992) (Posner, J.); see also Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. E.E.O.C., 543 F. Supp. 950, 956 (E.D. Va. 1982) 
(discussing facially procedural EEOC rules and their substantive impact and reasoning that when a purportedly 
“procedural” rule “trenche[es] upon the rights and obligations of the parties affected” it could be considered 
“substantive”), rev’d, 720 F.2d 804 (4th Cir. 1983). 
 200 In re Healthback, L.L.C., 226 B.R. 464, 474 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998), vacated, No. 97-22616, 1999 
WL 35012949 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. May 28, 1999). 
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2. Federal Jurisdiction: Claims Against the United States 
If § 405(h) refers to 28 U.S.C. § 41’s jurisdictional grant, and not 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 (federal question) and 1346 (concurrent jurisdiction to the district and 
other federal courts as to certain claims against the United States) as indicated 
in its text, then the entirety of § 41 must be enforced as it was then written, and 
not merely selectively. Applying this reasoning highlights the absurdity of 
referring to a law that was abrogated decades ago.  
For example, there can be no dispute that § 405(h) covers jurisdiction under 
§ 1346.201 Before 1948, § 1346 was part of 28 U.S.C. § 41(20), which at the 
time provided that: 
No suit against the Government of the United States shall be allowed 
under this paragraph unless the same shall have been brought within 
six years after the right accrued for which the claim is made. The 
claims of married women, first accrued during marriage, of persons 
under the age of twenty-one years, first accrued during minority, and 
of idiots, lunatics, insane persons, and persons beyond the seas at the 
time the claim accrued, entitled to the claim, shall not be barred if the 
suit be brought within three years after the disability has ceased; but 
no other disability than those enumerated shall prevent any claim 
from being barred, nor shall any of the said disabilities operate 
cumulatively.202 
The 1948 amendment broke the statute of limitations out of § 41 and re-
codified it at 28 U.S.C. § 2401: 
[E]very civil action commenced against the United States shall be 
barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of 
action first accrues. The action of any person under legal disability or 
beyond the seas at the time the claim accrues may be commenced 
within three years after the disability ceases.203 
 
 201 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1946); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 to 1348, 1350 to 1357, 1359, 1397, 2361, 2401, and 2402 
(1952); see also Bodimetric Health Servs. Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas., 903 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussing 
how § 405(h) bars action brought under diversity jurisdiction statute although § 1332 is no longer mentioned in 
§ 405(h)); AHN Homecare v. Home Health Reimbursement & HCFA, 222 B.R. 804, 807–08 (Bankr. N.D. 
Tex. 1998); In re St. Mary Hosp., 123 B.R. 14, 17 (E.D. Pa. 1991); In re Visiting Nurse Ass’n of Tampa Bay, 
Inc., 121 B.R. 114 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990). Absent from the re-codification was, for example, §  41(4)’s grant 
of original jurisdiction in the federal district courts for “all suits arising under any law relating to the slave 
trade.” 28 U.S.C. § 41(4) (1946).  
 202 28 U.S.C. § 41(20) (emphasis added). 
 203 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (1952). 
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Notably absent from § 2401 is the provision that labels married women 
“disabled” and stops the clock from running on the statute of limitations for 
claims against the United States while they are married. 
Although the “disabled” label is disparaging, if the term were still in effect, 
it would actually confer a benefit to married women. If § 405(h) refers to  
28 U.S.C. § 41, which ceased to exist in 1948, then a married woman whose 
claims against the United States arise during marriage would be able to avoid 
tolling the statute of limitations on those claims for potentially well beyond the 
six-year limit that applies to everyone else (albeit litigation of her claims 
would be limited to the Medicare appeals process). For example, if a woman’s 
Medicare dispute arises during her marriage and her husband dies nine years 
later, then she would still have an additional three years to bring her claim, for 
a total limitations period of twelve years, more than double that of a non-
married woman. Indeed, this is precisely the way courts during that era viewed 
28 U.S.C. § 41(20) as operating: “[I]f her marriage tolled the statute, she failed 
to start her action within three years after the death of her husband, and is 
clearly barred.”204  
Circuit and lower courts have held, outside of the bankruptcy context, that 
the omission of references to other grants of jurisdiction should be ignored, and 
the pre-1984 version of the statute should be applied. These courts reason that 
because Congress, in passing the 1984 law that adopted the 1976 revision, 
wrote that the 1984 amendments should not be “construed as changing or 
affecting any right, liability, status, or interpretation which existed (under the 
provisions of law involved) before that date.”205 But if this legislative language 
means any changes affecting a person’s rights must be ignored (as some courts 
have held), then all such changes—for example, with regard to the 
jurisdictional rights of women—would also have to be ignored. Thus, applying 
the “guidance” in § 2664(b)’s legislative note also requires ignoring 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2401 as it is currently written. Congress could not have intended such an 
absurd206 and likely unconstitutional result,207 and in 2016 and beyond, courts 
should not employ logical reasoning that would tend to enforce it.  
 
 204 Stubbs v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 1007, 1010 (M.D.N.C. 1938). 
 205 Bodimetric Health Services, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas., 903 F.2d 480, 488–89 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding 
that, even in the absence of reference to diversity jurisdiction provision 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in § 405(h), such 
suits were still barred). 
 206 See Luddington v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225, 228 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (“Section [42 
U.S.C.] § 1981 dates back to 1866. It is as unlikely that Congress was attempting to restore section 1981 to the 
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3. Federal Jurisdiction: Bankruptcy Jurisdiction 
The legislative history argument also fails because applying § 405(h) to 
§ 41 as it was written in 1935208 requires ignoring the numerous (and 
painstaking) changes Congress has since made to bankruptcy jurisdiction. In 
particular, it would require sidestepping the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to 
bankruptcy courts over a debtor’s estate, which was itself written into law to 
solve the complex jurisdictional fights that persisted during the preceding 
century.209 In short, enforcing 28 U.S.C. § 41 as it was written before 1948 
reinvigorates the jurisdictional morass that subsequent amendments to the 
Bankruptcy Code were expressly written to address—indeed, such a 
jurisdictional debate is the very topic of this article. 
In 1935, 28 U.S.C. § 41(19) stated, “The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction . . . [o]f all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy.”210 When § 41 
was broken out into subparts in 1948, § 41(19) became § 1334 and the 
“phraseology” was modified to read, “The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all matters and 
proceedings in bankruptcy.”211  
Section 1334 remained unchanged until 1978. The 1978 amendment arose 
in the context of growing dissatisfaction with the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 
which was still in effect at the time, causing Congress to overhaul the entire 
legislative scheme.212 Among the problems with the Bankruptcy Act at the 
time was the limited effectiveness of bankruptcy adjudication, which worked 
as follows: 
Before the [1978] Act, federal district courts served as bankruptcy 
courts and employed a ‘referee’ system. Bankruptcy proceedings 
were generally conducted before referees, except in those instances in 
which the district court elected to withdraw a case from a referee. 
The referee’s final order was appealable to the district court. The 
 
understanding of its framers . . . . The new civil rights act reflects contemporary policy and politics, rather than 
a dispute between Congress and the Supreme Court over the mechanics of interpretation.”). 
 207 Applying the statute in this way may violate the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. See 
Silbowitz v. Sec’y of Health, Ed. & Welfare, 397 F. Supp. 862, 867 (S.D. Fla. 1975), aff’d sub nom. Califano 
v. Silbowitz, 430 U.S. 924 (1977). 
 208 Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 379, § 205(h), 53 Stat. 1360, 1371. 
 209 See Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 
47, 62 (1997); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 53 (1982). 
 210 28 U.S.C. § 41(19) (1934). 
 211 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (Supp. II 1948). 
 212 See Posner, supra note 209, at 61. 
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bankruptcy courts were vested with ‘summary jurisdiction’—that is, 
with jurisdiction over controversies involving property in the actual 
or constructive possession of the court. And, with consent, the 
bankruptcy court also had jurisdiction over some ‘plenary’ matters—
such as disputes involving property in the possession of a third 
person.213 
Under this regime, however, “bankruptcy judges did not have sufficient 
jurisdictional and remedial powers to decide cases in an expeditious way—
they would have to refer issues outside their power to the supervising district 
court—and that bankruptcy judges’ subordinate status weakened their 
authority with litigants.”214 
To remedy this defect, Congress created “in each judicial district, as an 
adjunct to the district court for such district, a bankruptcy court which shall be 
a court of record known as the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
district.”215 Accompanying the creation of the courts was a broad jurisdictional 
grant in 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (which went into effect on April 1, 1984) that gave 
the bankruptcy courts “exclusive jurisdiction” of a debtor’s bankruptcy case 
and assets: 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district 
courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases 
under title 11. 
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive 
jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, the 
district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all 
civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases 
under title 11. 
(c) The bankruptcy court for the district in which a case under title 11 
is commenced shall exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by this 
section on the district courts. 
(d) Subsection (b) or (c) of this section does not prevent a district 
court or a bankruptcy court, in the interest of justice, from abstaining 
from hearing a particular proceeding arising under title 11 or arising 
in or related to a case under title 11. Such abstention, or a decision 
not to abstain, is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise. 
 
 213 N. Pipeline Const. Co., 458 U.S. at 53; Posner, supra note 209, at 62. 
 214 Posner, supra note 209, at 62; see also N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 53. 
 215 N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 53 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 151(a) (Supp. IV 1976)). 
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(e) The bankruptcy court in which a case under title 11 is commenced 
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever 
located, of the debtor, as of the commencement of such case.216 
Correspondingly, § 1334 was changed to provide for the appeals process: 
(a) The district courts for districts for which panels have not been 
ordered appointed under section 160 of this title shall have 
jurisdiction of appeals from all final judgments, orders, and decrees 
of bankruptcy courts. 
(b) The district courts for such districts shall have jurisdiction of 
appeals from interlocutory orders and decrees of bankruptcy courts, 
but only by leave of the district court to which the appeal is taken. 
(c) A district court may not refer an appeal under that section to a 
magistrate or to a special master.217 
Shortly after the enactment of the 1978 Act, in Northern Pipeline Construction 
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,218 the Supreme Court held that the authority of 
the bankruptcy courts violated Article III of the United States Constitution 
because it “gave Article III powers to judges who do not have lifetime tenure 
and independent salaries.”219 
Congress fixed the statute in 1984, and amended the unconstitutional 
elements of the bankruptcy courts’ jurisdictional grant in §  1334 as follows: 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district 
courts shall have original and exclusive Jurisdiction of all cases 
under title 11. 
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive 
jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, the 
district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all 
civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to 
cases under title 11. 
(c)(1) Nothing in this section prevents a district court in the interest 
of justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for 
 
 216 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. IV 1978) (emphasis added). 
 217 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (Supp. III 1978) (changing § 1334’s heading from “Bankruptcy matters and 
proceedings” to “Bankruptcy appeals”). 
 218 458 U.S. at 73. 
 219 Posner, supra note 209, at 93; see N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 73 (holding that the authority 
granted to bankruptcy courts violated Article III of the Constitution). 
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State law, from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding 
arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11. 
(2) Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a State 
law claim or State law cause of action, related to a case under title 11 
but not arising under title 11 or arising in a case under title 11, with 
respect to which an action could not have been commenced in a court 
of the United States absent jurisdiction under this section, the district 
court shall abstain from hearing such proceeding if an action is 
commenced, and can be timely adjudicated, in a State forum of 
appropriate jurisdiction. Any decision to abstain made under this 
subsection is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise. This subsection 
shall not be construed to limit the applicability of the stay provided 
for by section 362 of title 11, United States Code, as such section 
applies to an action affecting the property of the estate in bankruptcy. 
(d) The district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced or 
is pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property, 
wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, 
and of the estate.220 
Notably, Congress removed the provision providing bankruptcy courts with 
“all of the jurisdiction conferred by this section on the district courts.”221 
Given the substantial amount of effort and energy that went into 
overhauling the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 and 1984—again, an overhaul 
geared towards solving this very jurisdictional debate—it is implausible that 
Congress intended to deprive the bankruptcy courts of “exclusive jurisdiction” 
over the debtor and its estate when the debtor was a hospital that sought to 
challenge a Medicare payment decision. This would lead to the absurd result 
that the Bankruptcy Code’s protections do not apply to a small but not 
insignificant part of the population of debtors (insolvent hospitals relying on 
Medicare payments) due to an inferred deference to Medicare’s administrative 
expertise. If Congress preferred the development of administrative expertise to 
judicial efficiency in bankruptcy proceedings, it would have expressly 
excluded bankruptcy jurisdiction from every type of administrative proceeding 
in the Bankruptcy Code. But it did not. Instead, by providing “an independent 
basis for bankruptcy court jurisdiction,” Congress made clear that in the 
 
 220 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (Supp. III 1984) (emphasis added). 
 221 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1471(c) (Supp. IV 1978), with 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (Supp. III 1984). 
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Medicare Act and elsewhere, “exhaustion of administrative remedies pursuant 
to other jurisdictional statutes is not required.”222 
4. Section 2663 Contains Numerous Sections that Change Parties’ Rights 
If § 2663 of the DRA is interpreted to have made no changes to a party’s 
rights, many of its provisions lead to absurd results. And this, combined with 
the clarity of the Bankruptcy Code, makes it more likely that the actual 
scrivener’s error is the broad statement in § 2664(b) that none of the hundreds 
of changes in § 2663(a) alter a party’s rights. 
The court in Nurses’ Registry highlights four such absurdities: 
• A change in § 2663 to 42 U.S.C. § 1307 added to the law 
making it a crime to impersonate a “former wife divorced” to 
obtain information about a Social Security beneficiary’s 
benefits provisions for husbands, mothers, and fathers; no 
change in rights under § 2664(b) would mean that § 1307 still 
only made it a crime to impersonate a “former wife 
divorced.”223 
• “Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 422(b)(4), since repealed, 
which mandated deductions from Social Security benefits on 
account of refusal to accept rehabilitation services, to not 
apply to ‘full-time elementary or secondary school students’ 
between the ages of eighteen to twenty-two, whereas 
§ 422(b)(4) previously carved out all ‘full-time students’ of 
the same ages. If Defendants were right about the 
ineffectiveness of the DRA’s technical amendments, college 
students between the ages of eighteen to twenty-two would 
have continued to be exempt from § 422(b)(4) until its repeal 
in 1999.”224 
• “[M]ost remarkably, a ‘technical amendment’ in the DRA 
repealed an entire title of the SSA, Title XIII, which provided 
a program of unemployment benefits for federal seamen. If 
the DRA’s technical amendments truly did not ‘change or 
 
 222 In re Town & Country Home Nursing Servs., Inc., 963 F.2d 1146, 1154 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotation 
marks omitted). 
 223 In re Nurses’ Registry & Home Health Corp., 533 B.R. 590, 596 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2015). 
 224 Id. 
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affect any right,’ the Reconversion Unemployment Benefits 
for Seamen program is still federal law.”225 
• Regarding the Medicare Act, “At least one of the DRA’s 
sixty-five ‘technical amendments’ to the Medicare Act, while 
minor, is likewise unmistakably substantive. This amendment 
amended 42 U.S.C. § 1395y’s exclusion of certain benefits 
during the period from when an individual becomes eligible 
under Medicare to ‘the month in which such individual attains 
the age of 70,’ to an exclusion of benefits during the period 
from eligibility to ‘the month before the month in which such 
individual attains the age of 70.’ In other words, this 
‘technical amendment,’ which Congress claimed did not 
‘affect any right,’ abbreviated a benefits exclusion by a 
month.”226 
Therefore, if § 2663 made no changes to parties’ rights, then many of its 
textual changes make no sense. However, § 2664(b) has been plainly 
misapplied and misinterpreted because courts have wholly ignored its key 
qualifier: language limiting the time period of its efficacy. 
5. “Before That Date” Language 
Section 2664(b) of the “technical” amendments in the DRA states that, “but 
none of such amendments shall be construed as changing or affecting any 
right, liability, status, or interpretation which existed (under the provisions of 
law involved) before that date.”227 However, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1984, which granted bankruptcy courts broad jurisdictional authority over a 
debtor’s estate, was passed eight days before the DRA. As such, § 2664(b) 
actually preserves the jurisdictional rights granted to bankruptcy courts as they 
existed before the passage of the DRA, which would be based on the 
 
 225 Id. It bears noting that Title XIII’s effective period expired on June 30, 1950. Olga S. Halsey, 
Reconversion Unemployment Benefits for Seamen, SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN (Aug. 1949), https://www. 
ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v12n8/v12n8p15.pdf. But even reading this example out of the Nurses’ Registry 
court’s reasoning does not alter the overall conclusion that § 2663 does, in fact, alter rights. Nor does § 2663’s 
title, “OTHER TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS IN THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT AND RELATED 
PROVISIONS” and its location in “Subtitle D—Technical Corrections” change this outcome because where, 
as is the case with §  405(h), there is no ambiguity in the statutory language the “title of a statute . . . cannot 
limit the plain meaning of [its] text.” Pa. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998). 
 226 Nurses’ Registry, 533 B.R. at 596 n.11 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(3)(A)(iii) (1982) and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395y(b)(3)(A)(iii) (Supp. 1985)). 
 227 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2664(b), 98 Stat. 1162 (1984) (emphasis added). 
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Bankruptcy Reform Act. Section 2664(b)’s plain language228 therefore requires  
§ 1334 to be read out of § 405(h) because § 1334 was passed eight days earlier 
and grants significant procedural and substantive rights to bankruptcy courts 
over the debtor’s estate.229 Indeed, it is implausible that Congress enacted the 
Bankruptcy Code and its jurisdictional grant and then, just over a week later, 
abrogated parts of it in the Medicare Act without any explicit intent to do so. 
6. Courts Lack Power to Correct Technical Errors 
Finally, § 405(h) must be enforced as written even if its omission of § 1334 
is a technical error because courts cannot correct technical errors.230 If 
Congress enacts something it did not intend to, the solution is for Congress to 
pass another law amending it.231 Indeed, “courts only correct drafting errors 
where they are certain, usually for reasons of absurdity, that an error occurred, 
and where the error is a ‘technical mistake in transcribing’ a law rather than a 
‘substantive mistake in designing’ a law.”232 If the omission of § 1334 from 
§ 405(h) was a technical error, as the “legislative history” argument requires, it 
must nevertheless be enforced as written until Congress amends or rewrites it. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the compelling nature of the plain language argument, whether a 
bankruptcy court jurisdictional grant supersedes Medicare’s is an issue that has 
resulted in many contrary decisions over more than two decades. Still, the 
recent decisions in Nurses’ Registry and Bayou Shores remind bankruptcy 
attorneys and financial advisors that the bankruptcy court may offer relief to a 
distressed hospital by avoiding spending years wandering the desert that is the 
 
 228 Assuming § 405(h)’s jurisdictional grant is substantive and not procedural. See supra at note 193; In re 
Healthback, L.L.C., 226 B.R. 464, 472–73 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998), vacated, No. 97-22616, 1999 WL 
35012949 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. May 28, 1999). 
 229 The “under the provisions of law involved” parenthetical includes § 405(h) and § 1334. 
 230 Even if § 2664(b) and its apparently broad application is a scrivener’s error that a court cannot correct, 
enforcing it as written does not change the present analysis due to its qualifying time limitation language 
discussed above. 
 231 Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004) (“If Congress enacted into law something different 
from what it intended, then it should amend the statute to conform it to its intent. ‘It is beyond our province to 
rescue Congress from its drafting errors, and to provide for what we might think . . . is the preferred result.’ 
This allows both of our branches to adhere to our respected, and respective, constitutional roles. In the 
meantime, we must determine intent from the statute before us.” (quoting United States v. Granderson, 511 
U.S. 39, 68 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring))). 
 232 In re Nurses’ Registry & Home Health Corp., 533 B.R. 590, 595 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2015) (quoting 
King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2505 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
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Medicare appeals process and instead having its life-threatening disputes 
handled quickly and efficiently by a federal bankruptcy court. 
 
